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from: Torah Musings <[newsletter@torahmusings.com](mailto:newsletter@torahmusings.com)>  
date: Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 11:19 AM  
subject: Torah Musings Daily Digest for 6/8/2017: 3 new posts  
**Vort from the Rav: Beha'alochea**  
Bamidbar 10:2

עשה לך שתי תצוצרות כסף... והיו לך למקרא העדה ולמסע את המנוחות  
Make yourself two silver trumpets...they shall be used by you to summon the congregation and to announce the departure of the camps.

There are two ways in which people become bound as a group—as a community, a society, or a nation. The first is when they face a common enemy. They band together for mutual protection, knowing that only by so doing can they survive. This phenomenon extends far beyond Homo sapiens. Animals, too, come together in herds or flocks to defend themselves against predators. Such a group is a machaneh—a camp, a defensive formation. There is a quite different form of association. People can come together because they share a vision, an aspiration, a set of ideals. This is the meaning of edah, a congregation. Edah is related to the word ed, a witness. An edah is not a defensive formation but a creative one. People join to do together what none of them could achieve alone. A society built around a shared project, a vision of the common good, is not a machaneh but an edah—not a camp, but a congregation.

These are not just two types of groups, but in the most profound sense, two different ways of existing and relating to the world. A camp is brought into being by what happens to it from the outside.

A congregation comes into existence by internal decision. The former is reactive, the latter proactive. The first is a response to what has happened to the group in the past. The second represents what the group seeks to achieve in the future. Whereas camps exist even in the animal kingdom, congregations are uniquely human. They flow from the human ability to think, speak, communicate, envision a society different from any that has existed in the past, and to collaborate to bring it about.

Jews are a people in both these two quite different ways. Our ancestors became a machaneh in Egypt, forged together in the crucible of slavery and suffering. They were different. They were not Egyptians. They were Hebrews—a word which means “on the other side, an outsider.”

Ever since, Jews have known that we are thrown together by circumstance. We share a history all too often written in tears. This is the covenant of fate. This is not a purely negative phenomenon. It gives rise to a powerful sense that we are part of a single story—that what we have in common is stronger than the things that separate us. Our fate does not distinguish between aristocrats and common folk, between rich and poor, between a prince garbed in the royal purple and the pauper begging from door to door, between the pietist and the assimilationist. Even though we speak a plethora of languages, even though we are inhabitants of different lands, we still share the same fate. If the Jew in the hovel is beaten, then the security of the Jew in the palace is endangered. Do not think that you, of all the Jews, will escape with your life by being in the king's palace (Es. 4:13).

It leads also to a sense of shared suffering. When we pray for the recovery of a sick person, we do so “among all the sick of Israel.” When we comfort a mourner, we do so “among all the other mourners of Zion and Jerusalem.” We weep together. We celebrate together. This in turn leads to shared responsibility: “All Israel are sureties for one another.” And this leads to collective action in the field of welfare, charity and deeds of loving kindness. As Maimonides puts it: All Israelites and those who have attached themselves to them are to one another like brothers, as it is said, You are children of the Lord your God (Deut. 14: 1). If brother shows no compassion to brother, who then will? To whom shall the poor of Israel raise their eyes? To the heathens who hate and persecute them? Their eyes are therefore lifted to their brothers (Hilchos Matnos Aniyim 10:2).

All these are dimensions of the covenant of fate, born in the experience of slavery in Egypt. But there is an additional element of Jewish identity: the covenant of destiny (brit ye'ud)—entered into at Mount Sinai. This defines the people Israel not as the object of persecution but the subject of a unique vocation, to become a kingdom of priests and a holy nation (Ex. 19:6). Under this covenant, the Jewish people is defined not by what others do to it, but by the task it has undertaken, the role it has chosen to play in history. The Israelites did not choose to become slaves in Egypt. That was a fate thrust upon them by someone else. They did, however, choose to become God's people at Sinai when they said, We will do and obey (Ex. 24:7). Destiny, call, vocation, purpose, task: these create not a machaneh but an edah, not a camp but a congregation. (Rabbi Jonathan Sacks Summary of Kol Dodi Dofek)

From the newly released Chumash Mesoras HaRav - Sefer Bamidbar

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from: **Rabbi Yissocher Frand** <[ryfrand@torah.org](mailto:ryfrand@torah.org)>  
to: [ravfrand@torah.org](mailto:ravfrand@torah.org)  
date: Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 5:46 PM  
subject: Rav Frand - Use Time Carefully / How You Ask Makes a Big Difference

Rabbi Yissocher Frand  
Use Time Carefully / How You Ask Makes a Big Difference  
Yad Yechiel Never Miss Subscription These divrei Torah were adapted from the hashkafa portion of Rabbi Yissocher Frand's Commuter Chavrusah Tapes on the weekly portion: CD #991 – The Shabbos Bar Mitzva in the Good 'Ole Summertime. Good Shabbos!

The Message of the Leveyims' Five-Year Training Program  
The Torah says in this week's parsha that from the time a Levi is twenty-five years old, he enters into service in the Bais Hamikdash [Bamidbar 8:24]. However, as Rashi points out, there is a contradiction between this pasuk and another pasuk earlier in the sefer [Bamidbar 4:3], which states that the age of service for the Leveyim [Levites] begins at thirty, not at twenty-five. Rashi reconciles the two pesukim by explaining that the Levy comes to the Bais Hamikdash at age twenty-five to begin a five-year training period. Then he in fact begins to serve at age thirty, as is says in Parshas Bamidbar. The Shemen HaTov (volume 5) asks an interesting question: How long does a Kohen need to train? A Kohen's service in the Bais Hamikdash is

seemingly much more intricate and involved than a Levi's service. However, we do not find anywhere in the Torah that the Kohanim had a five year training period. The Torah does not even mention them having a one-year period of learning before they could start participating in the Avodah. Why is that?

The Shemen HaTov suggests a very interesting idea. A Kohen can perform the Avodah from the time he is Bar Mitzvah until the time he dies. He could be serving in the Bais Hamikdash for sixty or seventy years. A Levi's service is only for twenty years. As soon as he turns thirty, the clock starts ticking and once he becomes fifty, he is out of there. When someone has such a limited period of when he can do the Avodah, he wants to hit the ground running. He cannot waste any time. He needs to be ready on day one! He does not have the luxury of putting around with on the job training.

A Kohen, who potentially has sixty or seventy years of service ahead of himself, can take a couple of years "to get up to speed." However, a Levi, whose time is so limited, needs to know clearly, what he is doing from the first day on the job. Therefore, a Levi trains for five years before the clock starts ticking for him.

This thought conveys a message that I believe we should impress on our children while they are in their Yeshiva days. Boys enter Yeshiva when they are in high school at age 14. They look at their time as if they are going to be in Yeshiva for a very long time. It seems like forever. For most people, however, the time is limited. There is four years of high school then maybe three or four years of time in Beis Medrash. Then they get married and if they are lucky enough they can learn three, four, or five years in Kollel. Eventually, they have to face the reality of earning a livelihood. So how long is this very long time in Yeshiva for a Yeshiva bochur? For most people, it is 8 years, 10 years, or maybe 12 years and then it is over. When someone has such a limited amount of time and opportunity, one must make the best use of that time.

The most important thing we can impress on our children is "Don't waste your time while you are in Yeshiva." I was looking through some old notes of mine and I found on the back of my notes what I told one of my sons on the day he started ninth grade in Yeshiva. I told him he should try to learn sixty minutes an hour. That is the definition of a masmid [a diligent student]. A masmid is not necessarily someone who learns 18 hours a day. A masmid is someone who learns sixty minutes an hour, for however many hours a day he is able to devote to learning. Do not waste your time. That is a lesson we need to impress on our children.

When only a limited amount of time is available, we must make maximum use of it. Just as the Levi needed five years of preparation so that when he began his service at age 30, he would not need to "waste time" with on the job training, we need to be just as careful with the limited time that is available to us for our learning.

The Way A Question Is Posed Determines Half The Answer  
The Parsha relates the one and only time that Klal Yisrael brought a Korban Pessach [Paschal sacrifice] during their forty year sojourn in the Wilderness [Bamidbar 9:1-5]. Then the Torah says, "There were men who had been made impure by a human corpse and could not make the Pessach-offering on that day; so they approached Moshe and Aharon on that day." [Bamidbar 9:6] This group of tameh individuals were upset that they did not have the opportunity to participate in the mitzvah of Korban Pessach. They approached the leaders of the community and presented them with their problem: "...Why should we be left out by not offering Hashem's offering in its appointed time among the Children of Israel?" [Bamidbar 9:7] Moshe consulted with the Almighty and was taught the laws of the "Second Passover". Pessach Sheni is a unique concept whereby one who was impure or remote from the location of the Bais Hamikdash on the fourteenth of Nisan, which is the proper time for bringing the Pessach offering, has a chance to offer a "make-up Pessach sacrifice" a month later.

There seems to be somewhat of a redundancy in the pesukim describing this incident. Scripture already told us in pasuk 6 that "there were men who had

been made impure by a human corpse." Why then was it necessary for the people to also say in pasuk 7 "we are impure through a human course?" The sefer Yismach Yehudah from a Rabbi Yehudah Jacobowitz in Lakewood, NJ addresses this question. In Parshas Emor there is the story of the Blasphemer, who cursed the Name of G-d. There are different interpretations as to what exactly prompted this person to perform such a heinous crime. One of the interpretations is that this happened because of a "Din Torah" [civil dispute]. This man had an Egyptian father and a Jewish mother. He was thus "Jewish" but he did not belong to any Tribe (one's Jewish identity is based on matrilineal descent while one's Tribal identity is based on patrilineal descent). Consequently, he did not know with which camp to travel. Since his mother was from the Tribe of Dan, he went to that tribe and insisted that he was a Danite who had the right to travel in their camp.

He took the elders of the Tribe to a "Din Torah" over the matter and lost. He heard the verdict; he became upset and blasphemed the Name of G-d. We must ask a question here: Chazal tell us that Dan was called the "m'asef l'chol ha'machanos". For lack of a better translation, Dan was the caboose. He brought up the rear. The Tribe of Dan took care of all the stragglers. First of all, when there are a couple of million people travelling together in the desert, they are bound to drop things — Dan picked up the articles that were dropped on the way. When sick children caused people to fall behind — Dan picked them up. When, for whatever reason, a person became lost or could not keep up with the pace of everyone else — Dan picked them up. Shevet Dan, the "ma'asef l'chol ha'machanos" was the barrel for everyone to come into.

In this case, this person came to them with an apparently valid complaint: "I do not have a place; my mother is from Shevet Dan." The elders should have said, "Sure. Joint the crowd. We have a whole club back there at the end of the line with our tribe." Their reaction apparently was just the opposite. "This is not our problem. You are not from Shevet Dan, go somewhere else!"

Why is this fellow different from everyone else? The answer is that everybody else who came to Shevet Dan said, "Listen, I fell behind. My child was sick. I did not feel well. Can we travel with you?" The answer in those cases was "Fine." However, when someone justifies joining the group by saying, "I am a Danite, I belong here, and you need to let me in because this is my right!" then they say, "Sorry my friend, do not tell me this is your right. You do not belong here; we are not going to take you in!" That is what the pasuk is telling us here. We know that they were impure, but if their complaint was, "It is not fair! We missed bringing the Korban Pessach, you need to do something for us!" then we answer "Sorry. Life is not fair." However, if they come and say, "We know that the problem is ours, we know it is we who were impure, but give us a break because nebach we were impure" then it is a different story. When the approach is not a demand but a request, the response is completely different.

Just as Shevet Dan rejected him when he made a demand, but when asked for a favor, granted the favor, the same thing is true here by Pessach Sheni. The answer might have been different if they had come to Moshe and Aharon with demands. However, since they emphasized that the problem was their own "We were impure from contact with the dead" and therefore "why should we have to be excluded?" then Moshe Rabbeinu brought their case to the Almighty and the Almighty said, "Yes, in truth, we will do something to allow you to participate." That is why they received the right to bring a Pessach Sheni.

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Technical Assistance by Dovid Hoffman; Baltimore, MD

[dhoffman@torah.org](mailto:dhoffman@torah.org) This week's write-up is adapted from the hashkafa portion of Rabbi Yissochar Frand's Commuter Chavrusah Series on the weekly Torah portion. A listing of the halachic portions for Parshas Beha'aloscha is provided below:

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### **Blessing over the Candles**

#### **Rabbi Yirmiyohu Kaganoff**

The beginning of parshas Behaalos'cha discusses the kindling of the menorah. This provides me with enough of an excuse to talk about a different kindling mitzvah.

Question #1: When do I Kindle?

“What is the optimal way to recite the brochos and kindle the Shabbos lights?”

Question #2: Purchasing the Candlesticks

Is there a halachic basis for the custom that the chosson's family purchases candlesticks for his bride?

Question #3: Who Kindles the Candles?

“My mother can no longer light the Shabbos candles herself, but instead has her non-Jewish caretaker kindle them, and then Mother recites the brocha. Should I tell Mom not to do this, since one cannot recite a brocha on a mitzvah performed by a gentile?”

Question #4: When do We Kindle the Candles?

“My father-in-law insists that whoever kindles Shabbos lights in his house should recite the brocha before kindling, which is not my family's custom. What should we do when we visit them?”

#### **Introduction**

The questions above concern reciting brochos prior to lighting the Shabbos candles. We are all aware that immediately prior to accepting Shabbos, women kindle the Shabbos candles or lamps, cover their eyes, recite the appropriate brocha and thereby usher in Shabbos. However, most of us do not realize that this is not a universal practice. As a matter of fact, the Gemara never even mentions reciting a brocha upon the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights, and the practice of reciting the brocha after kindling them was not exclusive practice, even among Ashkenazim, until relatively lately. As we will soon see, most Sefardim follow a slightly different procedure than what was described above.

Why do we light Shabbos candles?

Let us start with a basic understanding of the mitzvah of having Shabbos lights. The rishonim provide several reasons why we kindle lights before Shabbos.

(1) Respect the meal

The Shabbos seudah should be treated with the respect of a festive banquet. The venue of formal dinners is always well illuminated (Rashi, Shabbos 25b s.v. Chovah; see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 30:5).

(2) Enjoy the meal

When someone cannot see what he is eating, he does not enjoy the meal. Therefore, there must be enough light to see the Shabbos meal (She'iltos #63).

(3) Avoid unpleasant atmosphere

It is depressing to sit in the dark, which is contrary to the atmosphere appropriate for Shabbos (Rashi, Shabbos 23b s.v. Shalom).

(4) Avoid getting hurt

If the house is dark, someone might stumble or collide with something and hurt himself, which is certainly not conducive to the enjoyment of Shabbos (Rashi, Shabbos 25b s.v. Hadlakas).

Differences in halacha

The different reasons mentioned may result in dissimilar halachic repercussions. For example, the first two reasons, honoring the Shabbos meal and enjoying it, require light only in the room where the Shabbos meal will be eaten. On the other hand, the fourth reason, preventing a person from

hurting himself, requires illumination in any part of the house through which one walks. Therefore, we should kindle lights in all areas of the house that may be used in the course of Shabbos (Magen Avraham 263:1, quoting Maharshal). Some authorities go further, contending that one should make sure that there are lights that burn all night in any such area (Kaf Hachayim). In earlier generations, this probably required a long-burning oil lamp; in today's world, this is easy to accomplish with electric lighting.

Other authorities suggest that the halachic obligation might extend even further – that we are required to make sure any dark area that may be entered on Shabbos day, such as a walk-in closet, be properly illuminated for the entire Shabbos. The Ketzos Hashulchan (74:1), who discusses this issue, does not reach a conclusion whether this is indeed required or not.

Whose mitzvah is it?

Who is required to kindle the Shabbos lights? Most people are surprised to discover that the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights is incumbent upon every individual. To quote the Rambam (Hilchos Shabbos 5:1): “Everyone is required to have a lamp lit in his house on Shabbos.” Although usually the lady of the house kindles the Shabbos lights, she does so as the agent of the rest of the family and also for their guests (Levush, Orach Chayim 263:3; Graz, Kuntros Acharon 263:2). Therefore, if there is no lady of the house, or if she is away for Shabbos, someone else must kindle the lights, instead. A man or group of men together for Shabbos are obligated to kindle lights, and students in a dormitory, whether in a yeshiva or a seminary, are required to kindle Shabbos lights. The requirement is not that each individual kindle his own Shabbos lights -- one person can function as an agent for the rest. Usually, this means that they have candles lit in a safe place, and that someone makes certain that there are electric lights burning in other places, as needed.

The Shabbos lights must be kindled by an adult. Although many have the custom that girls under bas mitzvah kindle their own Shabbos lights, this is always done in addition to an adult lighting.

When several women kindle Shabbos lights in one house, it is preferable that each light in a different place, so that each lamp provides illumination in a different area of the house.

Although the lady of the house usually is the one who does the actual kindling, her husband should participate in the mitzvah by preparing the lights for her (see Rabbi Akiva Eiger's comments to the Mishnah, Shabbos 2:6; Mishnah Berurah 263:12, 264:28). The proper practice is that her husband prepares the lights and the wicks, or sets up the candles so that they are ready for her to light. Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah (43:41) reports that he heard that this is the basis for the custom that the chosson purchases the candlesticks that his bride will be kindling after their marriage.

Rekindling lights

Assuming that, when Shabbos begins, the area is already illuminated with lighting that was turned on earlier in the day, is one required to extinguish the light and rekindle it for the sake of Shabbos? In other words: Is there a specific mitzvah to kindle lights, or is it sufficient to make sure that the area one plans to use is illuminated?

There actually appears to be a dispute among the rishonim regarding this question, and there are differences in halachic observance that result from those rulings. Some maintain that Chazal required only that one make certain that there is adequate illumination for Shabbos, but that it is sufficient to use lighting that was kindled earlier, not for the purpose of Shabbos (see Rambam, Hilchos Shabbos 5:1). Others maintain that Chazal required kindling lights especially for Shabbos. In their opinion, leaving lights already kindled does not fulfill the mitzvah that Chazal established (Tosafos, Shabbos 25b s.v. chovah).

Later authorities conclude that one needs to kindle only one light specifically in honor of Shabbos. Thus, if there are many lights kindled around the house, one is not required to extinguish all of them and rekindle them all for the sake of Shabbos, but one may leave most of the lights burning, provided one light is lit especially for Shabbos (see Ketzos

Hashulchan 74:1). The brocha is recited on the light that is kindled in the area where one will be eating (see Rema, Orach Chayim 263:10; Mishnah Berurah 263:2).

Some contemporary authorities have pointed out the following: The main illumination in our houses is electric lighting, which was not turned on specifically for the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights. Often, the illumination provided by the Shabbos candles is so insignificant that one hardly notices their light. Thus, if the primary purpose of kindling Shabbos lights is to provide illumination, the Shabbos candles are not really fulfilling their role. For this reason, the Shabbos lights should be placed where they provide illumination. Alternatively, one should turn the electric lights off immediately prior to kindling the Shabbos lamps, turn them on again for the sake of fulfilling the mitzvah of kindling Shabbos lights, then kindle the Shabbos oil or candles and recite a brocha which now includes both the electric lights and the oil or candles. (This is assuming that one is following the practice of reciting the brocha after kindling the lights. The order would be modified for those who recite the brocha before kindling the lights. See ahead.)

When to light?

When is the optimal time to kindle the Shabbos lights? In this context, the Gemara recounts an interesting story (Shabbos 23b). Rav Yosef's wife was accustomed to kindle the Shabbos lights immediately before Shabbos. She reasoned that it was a bigger honor for Shabbos if it was obvious that the kindling was being done for Shabbos (as explained by Ran). Rav Yosef corrected her, saying that it was better to kindle somewhat earlier in the day and not wait until right before sunset to light Shabbos candles.

Mrs. Yosef then thought that she should kindle much earlier, until an older scholar taught her that a beraisa (a halachic teaching dating back to the era of the Mishnah) teaches that it is best not to kindle the lights too early and not too late. Rashi explains that if one kindles the lights too early, it will not be noticeable that they are being kindled for Shabbos.

When is too early?

When is too early? The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 263:4) rules that one should not kindle the lights earlier than plag hamincha, and that one should accept Shabbos shortly after one kindles the lights. The decision to accept Shabbos at the time of the kindling demonstrates that it was performed specifically for the sake of Shabbos.

Did I automatically accept Shabbos?

Does kindling the Shabbos lights always mean that one is now accepting Shabbos?

This involves a dispute among early authorities. One of the geonim, the Baal Halachos Gedolos, contends that kindling the lights for Shabbos indicates that one intends to accept Shabbos immediately afterwards. This kindling is the symbolic acceptance of Shabbos. Others disagree with the Baal Halachos Gedolos, contending that although one is required to kindle lights for Shabbos, this kindling does not constitute accepting Shabbos (Ramban, quoted by Ran Shabbos 10 in the standard edition of the Rif's halachic code; Tosafos quoted by Tur Orach Chayim 263). The Ramban cites several reasons to support his approach: One reason is that since kindling the Shabbos lights is a forbidden melacha activity, how could performing a melacha be an act of accepting Shabbos? Furthermore, the Ramban contends that one might want to kindle the lights early, so that they are ready for Shabbos, and then take care of other Shabbos preparations that are more time consuming. This would be similar to someone setting up their Shabbos clocks on Friday morning in order to make sure that this task has been done. Could this possibly be considered an act of accepting Shabbos immediately?

Notwithstanding the Ramban's objections, the Ran, who quotes both sides of the dispute, concludes in accordance with the Baal Halachos Gedolos, that kindling the lights is considered accepting Shabbos.

When does one recite the brocha?

The Rema, when he quotes these laws, mentions two practices:

1. To recite the brocha before kindling.

2. To kindle the lights first, which today is common Ashkenazi practice. Although one always recites the brocha on a mitzvah prior to performing it (see Pesachim 7b), in this instance, reciting the brocha is considered accepting Shabbos (Magen Avraham). If that is true, how can one kindle the lights after one has already accepted Shabbos?

Women who follow this approach kindle the lights and then place their hand in front of the lights. Upon completing the brocha, they remove the hand so that the brocha is recited immediately before benefitting from the lights. Alternatively, a woman closes her eyes until she completes the brocha, and then opens them immediately after reciting the brocha.

The Shulchan Aruch cites both opinions in the dispute between the Baal Halachos Gedolos and the Ramban. He then notes that those who follow the Baal Halachos Gedolos' approach should recite the brocha, kindle the lights and then drop the match, but not shake it out. This is because kindling the last light is the actual acceptance of Shabbos. Thus, we see three different approaches:

1. The Ramban, who contends that kindling the lights is not an acceptance of Shabbos.
2. The standard Ashkenazi practice that reciting the brocha on the Shabbos lights accepts Shabbos.
3. The custom mentioned by the Shulchan Aruch that kindling the last of the Shabbos lights is the act of accepting Shabbos.

Mincha before lighting

According to the opinions mentioned above that kindling the lights constitutes an acceptance of Shabbos, women should daven mincha prior to kindling the Shabbos lights. Once one has accepted Shabbos, one may no longer daven a weekday mincha.

When men kindle the Shabbos lights, they generally do not accept Shabbos immediately. This is because a man who must kindle the Shabbos lights has yet to go to shul to daven mincha, which he could not do if he had already accepted Shabbos.

There are extenuating circumstances in which a woman may not want to accept Shabbos immediately at the time that she kindles. The authorities conclude that it is preferable for a woman who does not want to accept Shabbos to verbalize, before she kindles the lights, that she is making a condition not to accept Shabbos this week when she recites the brocha on the lights.

In these situations, should an Ashkenazi woman recite the brocha before she kindles, or should she follow her usual practice of kindling the lights and then reciting the brocha? We find a dispute among later authorities as to which is the better procedure (see Bi'ur Halacha 263:5 s.v. Achar).

Brocha before kindling

At this point, let us examine one of our opening questions: "My father-in-law insists that whoever kindles Shabbos lights in his house should recite the brocha before kindling, which is not my family's custom. What should we do when we visit them?"

Most people refer to this as the difference between Ashkenazi and Sefardi customs. But, as we noted above, even the Rema, the primary halachic codifier of Ashkenazi practice, did not consider lighting before making the brocha to be a universal Ashkenazi custom. Furthermore, as we noted above, all authorities agree that, if one has a valid reason for not accepting Shabbos when kindling, one is not required to do so.

Consequently, it would seem to me that the goal of shalom bayis, in this instance maintaining peace in the house between the visiting married children and their father (father-in-law), is a valid enough reason that the married daughter should not accept Shabbos when she recites the brocha. Once she decided not to accept Shabbos with the reciting of the brocha, she has halachic basis to follow her father's request and recite the brocha before kindling. (Please do not draw a conclusion that I agree with the father's approach, either to halacha or to hachnasas orchim. I don't.)

Having a gentile light

At this point, let us examine the last of our opening questions: “My mother can no longer light the Shabbos candles herself, but, instead, has her non-Jewish caretaker kindle them, and then Mother recites the brocha. Should I tell Mom not to do this, since one cannot recite a brocha on a mitzvah performed by a gentile?”

If I am unable to kindle the Shabbos lights myself, may I ask a non-Jew to kindle them for me? If the mitzvah is to kindle the lights, then I have not fulfilled a mitzvah this way, since a non-Jew cannot be my agent to fulfill a mitzvah. On the other hand, if the mitzvah is for the house to be illuminated, having a gentile kindle lights for me fulfills the mitzvah, since the house is now illuminated.

We usually assume that the mitzvah is indeed to kindle a light especially for Shabbos. Therefore, it would seem that I cannot have a non-Jew light for me, and this is indeed the conclusion of several authorities (Magen Avraham 263:11; Mishnah Berurah 263:21). However, there is an early authority who rules that one can have a gentile kindle the lights and the Jew may recite the brocha (Maharam, quoted by Magen Avraham 263:11). (Among the later authorities, Rabbi Akiva Eiger [ad locum] questions the Maharam’s suggestion, but Rav Pesach Frank [Shu”t Har Tzvi #141] justifies it. I suggest that this she’eilah be discussed with one’s rav or posek.

In conclusion

The Gemara (Shabbos 23b) teaches that someone who kindles Shabbos lights regularly will merit having sons who are Torah scholars. It is for this reason that, immediately after kindling the Shabbos lights, women recite prayers asking that their children grow in this direction. Let us hope and pray that in the merit of observing these halachos correctly, we will have children and grandchildren who light up the world with their Torah!

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From: Mordechai Tzion toratravaviner@yahoo.com [ravaviner] <ravaviner-noreply@yahoogroups.com> via returns.groups.yahoo.com reply-to: ravaviner-owner@yahoogroups.com to: ravaviner@yahoogroups.com date: Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 1:23 PM subject: [ravaviner] **Hilchot Spinner** [1 Attachment]

Hilchot Spinner

Yeshivat Ateret Yerushalayim From the teachings of the Rosh Yeshiva **Ha-Rav Shlomo Aviner Shlit" a** Prepared by Rabbi Mordechai Tzion Visit our blog: [www.ravaviner.com](http://www.ravaviner.com)

Hilchot Spinner

Is a Spinner Nonsense

Q: Some claim that the new "Spinner" is nonsense and therefore one should refrain from letting kids play with it?

A: Almost all games are nonsense, but kids need to play. Every person needs to take a bit of a break (See Rambam, Shemoneh Perakim Chapter 5), and this is all the more so true for children. The essence is not to overdo it. Although there are smart games, such as Chess, kids also need easier games. In sum, it is no different than any other game, and one should not over do it or become addicted to it.

Girl Playing with a Spinner

Q: Is it permissible for a girl to play with a spinner while walking in the street or does it draw unwanted attention to her?

A: It is permissible, since many play with it and it does not especially draw attention.

Spinner in a Shul or Beit Midrash

Q: Is it permissible to play with a spinner in a Shul or Beit Midrash?

A: In general, a Beit Midrash is holier than a Shul. The reason is that in a Shul, we turn to Hashem in prayer, but in a Beit Midrash, Hashem turns to us through Torah learning. It is therefore permissible to turn a Shul into a Beit Midrash, but not visa-versa, since we go up in holiness and not down. Nonetheless, there are more leniencies regarding a Beit Midrash since a person spends much of his time there and it is his home. In a time of need, one may therefore eat and sleep there. This leniency also applies to other

acts which are not Torah learning and prayer on condition that they are not acts of frivolity. See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim #151. It is therefore permissible to play with a spinner in a Beit Midrash when one needs it for concentration, but this is forbidden in a Shul. If one claims: but it helps one concentrate during Davening? We are not in Shul for so long, and a person can concentrate for this amount of time without it.

Playing with a Spinner during Davening and Torah Learning

Q: It is correct that it is forbidden to play with a spinner during a Torah class, Torah reading and Torah learning?

A: Correct. Absolutely. One needs to have awe of holiness. Berachot 22a. Spinner on Shabbat

Q: Is it permissible to play with a spinner on Shabbat? Is it forbidden on account of "Refuah" (medicinal purposes) since it is meant to help people with issues of concentration?

A: 1. If it has lights, it is forbidden on Shabbat. 2. If it does not have lights, it is not forbidden on account of "Refuah", since it is not recognizable as such. 3. It is considered like any other a toy, and is thus permissible for Ashkenazim and an issue of dispute among Sefardic Poskim. See Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chaim 308:45. Mishnah Berurah 338:21. Yalkut Yosef - Shabbat Volume 2 308:6. Shut Or Le-Tzion Volume 2 26:8. 4. If one can take it apart and reassemble it as part of a game, there is no problem of building.

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from: Shabbat Shalom <shabbatshalom@ounetwork.org>

reply-to: shabbatshalom@ounetwork.org

date: Thu, Jun 8, 2017 at 5:37 PM

**Leadership Beyond Despair**

Britain's Former **Chief Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks**

Tanakh, the Hebrew Bible, is remarkable for the extreme realism with which it portrays human character. Its heroes are not superhuman. Its non-heroes are not archetypal villains. The best have failings; the worst often have saving virtues. I know of no other religious literature quite like it.

This makes it very difficult to use biblical narrative to teach a simple, black-and-white approach to ethics. And that – argued R. Zvi Hirsch Chajes (Mevo ha-Aggadot) – is why rabbinic midrash often systematically re-interprets the narrative so that the good become all-good and the bad all-bad. For sound educational reasons, Midrash paints the moral life in terms of black and white.

Yet the plain sense remains (“A biblical passage never loses its plain interpretation”, Shabbat 63a), and it is important that we do not lose sight of it. It is as if monotheism brought into being at the same time a profound humanism. God in the Hebrew Bible is nothing like the gods of myth. They were half-human, half-divine. The result was that in the epic literature of pagan cultures, human heroes were seen as almost like gods: semi-divine.

In stark contrast, monotheism creates a total distinction between God and humanity. If God is wholly God, then human beings can be seen as wholly human – subtle, complex mixtures of strength and weakness. We identify with the heroes of the Bible because, despite their greatness, they never cease to be human, nor do they aspire to be anything else. Hence the phenomenon of which the sedra of Beha’alotecha provides a shattering example: the vulnerability of some of the greatest religious leaders of all time, to depression and despair.

The context is familiar enough. The Israelites are complaining about their food:

“The rabble among them began to crave other food, and again the Israelites started wailing and said, ‘If only we had meat to eat! We remember the fish we ate in Egypt at no cost—also the cucumbers, melons, leeks, onions and garlic. But now we have lost our appetite; we never see anything but this manna!’” (Num 11:4-6)

This is not a new story. We have heard it before (see for example Exodus 16). Yet on this occasion, Moses experiences what one can only call a breakdown:

He asked the Lord, “Why have You brought this trouble on Your servant? What have I done to displease You that You put the burden of all these people on me? Did I conceive all these people? Did I give them birth? . . . I cannot carry all these people by myself; the burden is too heavy for me. If this is how You are going to treat me, put me to death right now—if I have found favour in Your eyes—and do not let me face my own ruin.” (Num. 11:11-15)

Moses prays for death! Nor is he the only person in Tanakh to do so. There are at least three others. There is Elijah, when after his successful confrontation with the prophets of Baal at Mount Carmel, Queen Jezebel issues a warrant that he be killed:

Elijah was afraid and ran for his life. When he came to Beersheba in Judah, he left his servant there, while he himself went a day’s journey into the desert. He came to a broom tree, sat down under it and prayed that he might die. “I have had enough, Lord,” he said. “Take my life; I am no better than my ancestors.” (I Kings 19:3-4)

There is Jonah, after God had forgiven the inhabitants of Nineveh: Jonah was greatly displeased and became angry. He prayed to the Lord, “O Lord, is this not what I said when I was still at home? That is why I was so quick to flee to Tarshish. I knew that you are a gracious and compassionate God, slow to anger and abounding in love, a God who relents from sending calamity. Now, O Lord, take away my life, for it is better for me to die than to live.” (Jonah 4:1-3)

And there is Jeremiah, after the people fail to heed his message and publicly humiliate him:

“O Lord, You enticed me, and I was enticed; You overpowered me and prevailed. I am ridiculed all day long; everyone mocks me . . . The word of the Lord has brought me insult and reproach all day long . . . Cursed be the day I was born! May the day my mother bore me not be blessed! Cursed be the man who brought my father the news, made him very glad, saying, “A child is born to you—a son!” . . . Why did I ever come out of the womb to see trouble and sorrow and to end my days in shame?” (Jeremiah 20:7-18)

Lehavdil elef havdalot: no comparison is intended between the religious heroes of Tanakh and political heroes of the modern world. They are different types, living in different ages, functioning in different spheres. Yet we find a similar phenomenon in one of the great figures of the twentieth century, Winston Churchill. Throughout much of his life he was prone to periods of acute depression. He called it “the black dog”. He told his daughter, “I have achieved a great deal to achieve nothing in the end”. He told a friend that “he prays every day for death”. In 1944 he told his doctor, Lord Moran, that he kept himself from standing close to a train platform or overlooking the side of a ship because he might be tempted to commit suicide: “A second’s desperation would end everything”.<sup>1</sup>

Why are the greatest so often haunted by a sense of failure? Storr, in the book mentioned above, offers some compelling psychological insights. But at the simplest level we see certain common features, at least among the biblical prophets: a passionate drive to change the world, combined with a deep sense of personal inadequacy. Moses says, “Who am I . . . that I should lead the Israelites out of Egypt?” (Ex. 3:11). Jeremiah says: “I cannot speak: I am only a child” (Jer. 1:6). Jonah tries to flee from his mission. The very sense of responsibility that leads a prophet to heed the call of God can lead him to blame himself when the people around him do not heed the same call.

Yet it is that same inner voice that ultimately holds the cure. The prophet does not believe in himself: he believes in God. He does not undertake to lead because he sees himself as a leader, but because he sees a task to be done and no one else willing to do it. His greatness lies not within himself but beyond himself: in his sense of being summoned to a task that must be done however inadequate he knows himself to be.

Despair can be part of leadership itself. For when the prophet sees himself reviled, rebuked, criticised; when his words fall on stony ground; when he sees people listening to what they want to hear, not what they need to hear – that is when the last layers of self are burned away, leaving only the task, the mission, the call. When that happens, a new greatness is born. It now no longer matters that the prophet is unpopular and unheeded. All that matters is the work and the One who has summoned him to it. That is when the prophet arrives at the truth stated by Rabbi Tarfon: “It is not for you to complete the task, but neither are you free to stand aside from it” (Avot 2:16).

Again without seeking to equate the sacred and the secular, I end with some words spoken by Theodore Roosevelt (in a speech to students at the Sorbonne, Paris, 23 April 1910), which sum up both the challenge and the consolation of leadership in cadences of timeless eloquence:

It is not the critic who counts, Not the man who points out how the strong man stumbles, Or where the doer of deeds could actually have done them better. The credit belongs to the man who is actually in the arena, Whose face is marred by dust and sweat and blood, Who strives valiantly, Who errs and comes short again and again – Because there is no effort without error and shortcoming; But who does actually strive to do the deeds, Who knows great enthusiasms, the great devotions, Who spends himself in a worthy cause, Who at the best knows in the end the triumph of high achievement, And who, at the worst, if he fails, at least fails while daring greatly, So that his place shall never be with those cold and timid souls who neither know victory nor defeat.

Leadership in a noble cause can bring despair. But it also is the cure.

1 These quotes are taken from Churchill’s Black Dog by Anthony Storr.

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Ohr Somayach

Insights into Halacha

**Rabbi Yehuda Spitz**

**Weighty Waiting Options**

For the week ending 6 June 2015 / 19 Sivan 5775

We often find that the Torah’s description of even simple actions of our great forefathers impart to us a treasure trove of hanhaga, hashkafa, and even halacha.[1] Sometimes though, it is the exact opposite; a halacha is gleaned from the acts of those far from being paragons of virtue. In our parshiyos hashuva we learn fascinating halachic insights from people whom we would not consider role models by any stretch of the imagination.

Double Agents

Parshas Shelach details at length the grave sin of the Meraglim, the spies whose evil report about Eretz Yisrael still echoes, with repercussions continuing to be felt until today[2]. Of the twelve spies sent, only two remained loyal to Hashem: Yehoshua bin Nun and Calev ben Yefuneh[3]. The other ten chose to slander Eretz Yisrael instead, and consequently suffered immediate and terrible deaths. Due to their vile report, the Jewish people were forced to remain in the desert an additional forty years, and eventually die out, before their children ultimately were allowed to enter Eretz Yisrael.

Hashem called this rogues’ gallery of spies an ‘eidah’[4], literally a congregation. The Gemara[5] famously derives from this incident that the minimum requirement for a minyan is a quorum of ten men, since there were ten turncoat ‘double-agents’ who were contemptuously called a congregation. If ten men can get together to conspire and hatch malevolent schemes, then ten men can assemble to form a congregation for ‘devarim shebekedusha’. This exegesis is duly codified in halacha[6], and all because of the dastardly deeds of ten misguided men[7].

Covetous Carnivores

Another prime example of halacha being set by the actions of those less than virtuous[8],[9] is the tragic chapter of the rabble rousers who lusted after

meat, and disparaged Hashem's gift of the Heavenly bread called manna (munn), chronicled at the end of Parshas Beha'alozecha[10]. The pasuk states that "the meat was still between their teeth" when these sinners met their untimely and dreadful demise[11]. The Gemara[12] extrapolates that since the Torah stressed that point, it means to show us that meat between the teeth is still considered tangible meat and one must wait before having a dairy meal afterwards.

There are actually several different ways to understand the Gemara's intent, chief among them are Rashi's and the Rambam's opinions[13]. The Rambam[14] writes that meat tends to get stuck between the teeth and is still considered meat for quite some time afterward. Rashi[15], however, doesn't seem to be perturbed about actual meat residue stuck in the teeth, but simply explains that since meat is fatty by nature, its taste lingers for a long time after eating.

Yet, the Gemara itself does not inform us what the mandated set waiting period is. Rather, it gives us several guideposts that the Rishonim use to set the halacha. The Gemara informs us that Mar Ukva's father would not eat dairy items on the same day that he had partaken of meat, but Mar Ukva himself (calling himself 'vinegar the son of wine') would only wait 'm'seudasa l'seudasa achrina', from one meal until a different meal[16].[17] The various variant minhagim that Klal Yisrael keep related to waiting after eating meat are actually based on how the Rishonim understood this cryptic comment.

#### Six Hours

This, the most common custom, was first codified by the Rambam. He writes that meat stuck in the teeth remains "meat" for up to 6 hours, and mandates waiting that amount. This is the halacha according to the Tur and Shulchan Aruch[18], as well as the vast majority of authorities. The Rashal, Chochmas Adam, and Aruch Hashulchan[19] all write very strongly that one should wait six hours. The mandated six hours seemingly comes from the many places in Rabbinic literature where it mentions that the 'meals of a Torah scholar' are six hours apart[20]. Therefore, this fits well with Mar Ukva's statement that he would wait from one meal until the next after eating meat, meaning six hours.

#### Five Hours and a Bit

The idea of waiting five hours and a bit, or five and a half hours, is actually based on the choice of words of several Rishonim, including the Rambam and Meiri, when they rule to wait six hours. They write that one should keep "k'mosheish sha'os", approximately six hours[21]. Several contemporary authorities maintain that "six hours" does not have to be an exact six hours; waiting five and a half (or according to some even five hours and one minute) is sufficient, as it is almost six hours[22]. However, it should be noted that not everyone agrees to this, and many maintain that the six hours must be exact[23].

#### Four Hours

Waiting four hours is first opined by the Pri Chadash, who comments that the six hours mandated are not referring to regular "sixty minute" hours, but rather halachic hours, known colloquially as "sha'os zmanios". This complicated halachic calculation is arrived at by dividing the amount of time between sunrise and sunset into twelve equal parts. Each of these new "hours" are halachic hours and are used to calculate the various zmanim throughout the day. The Pri Chadash asserts that at the height of winter when days are extremely short, it is possible that six hours can turn into only four halachic hours[24]! Although several authorities rule this way, and others say one may rely on this exclusively in times of great need[25], nevertheless, his opinion here is rejected out of hand by the vast majority of desisors, who maintain that the halacha follows six true hours[26]. The Yad Efraim points out that if one follows "sha'os zmanios" in the winter, then he must also follow it during the summer, possibly needing to wait up to eight hours!

#### One Hour

Waiting only hour between meat and dairy, a common custom among Jews from Amsterdam, is codified by the Rema, citing common custom, based on

several great Ashkenazic Rishonim including the Maharil and Maharai[27]. The Rema himself, though, concludes that it is nevertheless proper to wait six hours.

#### Three Hours

Interestingly, and shocking to some, the common German custom of waiting three hours does not seem to have an explicit halachic source[28]. In fact, one who delves into the sefarim of great Rabbanim who served throughout Germany, from Rav Yonason Eibeshutz to Rav Samson Raphael Hirsch, will find that they all recommended keeping the full six hours! Yet, there are several theories[29] explaining how such a widespread custom came about. One, by the Mizmor L'Dovid, is that it is possibly based on the Pri Chadash's opinion of sha'os zmanios. Another hypothesis, by Rav Binyomin Hamburger - author of Shorshei Minhag Ashkenaz, is that their original custom was to wait only one hour like the basic halacha cited by the Rema, following the majority of Ashkenazic Rishonim. Yet, when the six hours mandated by the Rambam and other Rishonim became more widespread, those in Ashkenaz decided to meet the rest of the world halfway, as a sort of compromise. According to this explanation, it turns out that waiting three hours is intrinsically a chumra on waiting one hour.

#### Bentch and Go

Another opinion, and one not halachically accepted, is that of Tosafos[30], who posit that "from one meal to another" means exactly that. As soon as one finishes his meat meal, clears off the table and recites Birkas HaMazon, he may start a new dairy meal. Some add that this includes washing out the mouth and palate cleansing (kinuach and hadacha). This is actually even more stringent than Rabbeinu Tam's opinion, that all one needs is kinuach and hadacha, and then one may eat dairy - even while part of the same meal[31]! It is important to realize that his opinion here is categorically rejected by all on a practical level.

#### A Day Away

The most stringent opinion is not to eat meat and milk on the same day (some call this a full 24 hours, but it seems a misnomer according to most authorities' understanding). First mentioned by Mar Ukva as his father's personal custom, several great Rabbonim through the ages have been known to keep this. Interestingly, this custom is cited by Rav Chaim Falag'i[32] as the proper one, and in his opinion, only those who are not able to stick to it can rely upon a 'mere' six hours.

#### Just Sleep On It

Another remarkable, but not widely accepted, custom is that of sleeping after eating a meat meal. The proponents of this, including Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt"l, maintain that sleeping causes the food to digest quicker, thereby lessening the required waiting period[33]. It is told that the Chasam Sofer wanted to start relying on this leniency, but upon awakening, every time he tried drinking his coffee it would spill. He concluded that this heter must not have been accepted in Heaven[34]. The majority of contemporary authorities as well, do not rely on sleeping as a way of lessening the waiting time[35]. The Steipler Gaon zt"l is quoted as remarking that this leniency is the exclusive domain of Rav Elyashiv zt"l, as most people sleep six hours a night and he only slept three hours nightly.

Although there are many different and widespread opinions about the proper amount of time one is required to wait after eating meat, and "minhag avoseinu Torah hi[36]", nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the core requirement of waiting is based on the actions of those with less than perfect intentions. As it is stated in Pirkei Avos[37] "Who is wise? One who learns from every one."

L'zechus Shira Yaffa bas Rochel Miriam v'chol yotzei chalatzeha for a yeshua teikif umiyad.

For any questions, comments or for the full Mareh Mekomos / sources, please email the author: yspitz@ohr.edu.

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[1] See article titled 'Maaseh Avos = Halacha L'Maaseh' at length.

[2] See Mishna Taanis 26b and following Gemara on 29a, that this, the first of five tragedies, occurred on Tishah B'Av.

[3] Calev's father's real name was actually Chetzron. See Divrei HaYamim (vol. 1, Ch. 2, verse 18) and Gemara Sota 11b.

[4] Bamidbar (Shelach) Ch. 14, verse 27.

[5] Gemara Megilla 23b, Brachos 21b, and Sanhedrin 74b. See Rashi al HaTorah ad loc. s.v. l'eidah.

[6] Rambam (Hilchos Tefilla Ch. 8, Halacha 5), Tur & Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chaim 55, 1 & 69, 1), Aruch Hashulchan (55, 6), and Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (15, 1). Many authorities cite this as the source for this law, including the Bach (Orach Chaim 55, 1), Taz (ad loc. 1), Levushei Srad (ad loc 1), Chida (Birkei Yosef ad loc 3), Shulchan Aruch HaRav (ad loc 2), Mishna Berura (ad loc 2), and Kaf Hachaim (ad loc 6).

[7] For a full treatment of the Meraglim and their intentions, see relevant commentaries to Parshas Shelach, as well as Rabbi Moshe M. Eisemann's excellent "Tear Drenched Nights - Tish'ah B'Av: The Tragic Legacy of the Meraglim".

[8] Another interesting example of this is a potential halacha we glean from Bilaam. The Gemara (Brachos 7a) explains that Bilaam knew the exact millisecond that Hashem got angry and knew how to properly curse during that time. Tosafos (ad loc. s.v. she'ilmalei and Avodah Zarah 4b s.v. rega) asks what type of curse was it possible for him to utter in such a limited time frame (a fraction of a second!) and gives two answers: 1) the word 'kaleim', 'destroy them' 2) once Bilaam started his curse in that exact time frame, he 'locked it in' and can continue as long as it takes, since it is all considered in that exact time. The Aruch Hashulchan (Orach Chaim 110, 5) takes the second approach a step further and applies this idea to Tefilla B'Zman. As long as one starts his Tefilla before the Sof Zman, it is considered that he 'made the zman' even if the majority of his Tefilla actually took place after the Sof Zman. Although not everyone agrees with this [indeed, many poskim, including the Magen Avraham (Orach Chaim 89, 4 and 124, 4), Pri Megadim (Orach Chaim 89, Eshel Avraham 4 and 110, Eshel Avraham 1), and Mishna Berura (58, 5 and 89, end 5), are makpid that one must finish his Tefilla before the Sof Zman], nevertheless a similar logic (based on Bilaam) is presented by the Machatzis HaShekel (Orach Chaim 6, end 6), quoting the Bais Yaakov (Shu"t 127) in the name of the Arizal regarding Tefillas HaTzibbur. If such design worked for one as despicable and reprehensible as Bilaam to enable him to curse us, how much more so should it work for us regarding Tefilla B'Tzibbur which is an eis ratzon!

[9] An additional example of a halacha gleaned from the wicked actions of Bilaam is that of Tzaar Ba'alei Chaim, causing living creatures unnecessary pain. Although the Gemara (Bava Metzia 32a-b) debated whether this halacha is D'Oraysa or DeRabbanan, according to most authorities, including the Rambam (Hilchos Rotzeach Ch. 13, 13), Rif (Bava Metzia 17b), Rosh (ad loc. 30), Sefer HaChinuch (Mitzva 451, end s.v. kasav), Tur (Choshen Mishpat 272, 11), Rema (ad loc. 9), Bach (ad loc. 5), Gr"a (ad loc. 11), SM"A (ad loc. 15), Kitzur Shulchan Aruch (191,1), and Aruch Hashulchan (Choshen Mishpat 272, 2), as well as the mashmaos of the Gemara Shabbos (128b), Tzaar Ba'alei Chaim is indeed D'Oraysa. According to the Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim vol. 3, end Ch. 17) and Sefer Chassidim (666) this can be gleaned from Bilaam's actions of hitting his donkey. In fact, they maintain that since Bilaam remarked that if he had a sword in his hand he would have killed his donkey on the spot, that is why he eventually was slain b'davka by sword! Thanks are due to Rabbi Shimon Black of the London Beis Din for pointing out several of these sources.

[10] Bamidbar (Beha'alochecha) Ch. 11.

[11] Ad loc. verse 33.

[12] Gemara Chullin 105a, statements of Rav Chisda.

[13] For example, the Kreisi U'Pleisi (Yoreh Deah 89, Pleisi 3) and Chochmas Adam (40, 13) posit that the waiting period is actually dependant on digestion.

[14] Rambam (Hilchos Ma'achalos Asuros Ch.9, 28).

[15] Rashi, in his glosses to Gemara Chullin 105a s.v. asur.

[16] Although the Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 89, 4) maintains that the waiting period starts from when one finishes theseudah that he partook of meat, nevertheless, most authorities, including many contemporary decisors, follow the Dagul Mervavah (ad loc. 1), and are of the opinion that the waiting period starts immediately after one finishes eating the actual meat product and not the entire seudah. These poskim include the Erech Hashulchan (ad loc. 3), Darchei Teshuva (ad loc. 4), Atzei HaOlah (Hilchos Basar Bechalav, Klal 3, 1), Shu"t Moshe HaSh (Yoreh Deah 16), and the Kaf Hachaim (ad loc. 9), as well as Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (cited in Piskei Halachos, Yoreh Deah, Basar Bechalav 8, pg. 54), Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner (Kovetz m'Bais Levi on Yoreh Deah, Basar Bechalav 2, pg. 33), the Debreciner Rav and Rav Asher Zimmerman (both cited in Rayach HaBosem on Basar Bechalav Ch. 3, Question 28), Rav Chaim Pinchas Scheinberg (cited in Shu"t Divrei Chachamim, Yoreh Deah Ch. 1, Question 6), Rav Chaim Kanievisky (cited in Doleh U'Mashkeh pg. 257), Rav Menashe Klein (Shu"t Mishna Halachos vol. 5, 97, 2), the Rivevos Efraim (vol. 5, 516), and Rav Shalom Krauss (Shu"t Divrei Shalom on Yoreh Deah, 25).

[17] For an elucidation of what exactly Mar Ukva and his father disagreed upon see Toras HaAsham (76, s.v. v'kasav d'nohagin).

[18] Tur and Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh Deah 89, 1).

[19] The Rashal (Yam Shel Shlomo, Chullin Ch. 8, 9; quoted l'maaseh by the Shach - Yoreh Deah 89, 8) writes that anyone who has even a "scent of Torah" would wait six hours. The Chochmas Adam (ibid.) writes that whoever doesn't wait six hours violates "Al Titosh Toras Imecha" (Mishlei Ch. 1, verse 8). The Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 89, 7) writes that whoever doesn't wait six hours is in the category of "HaPoretz Geder" who deserves to be bitten by a snake (Koheles Ch. 10 verse 8).

[20] See, for example Gemara Shabbos 10a, Ritva (Chullin 105a s.v. basar bein), Rashba (ad loc.), Rosh (ad loc. 5), Baal HaTur (Shaar 1, Hilchos Basar BeChalav 13a-b), Lechem Mishna (on the Rambam ibid.), Biur HaGra (Yoreh Deah 89, 2), and Mor U'Ketzia (Orach Chaim 184 s.v. v'chein).

[21] Rambam (ibid.), Meiri (Chullin 105a s.v. v'hadar), Agur (223), Kol Bo (106, s.v. v'achar basar), Orchos Chaim (vol. 2, Hilchos Issurei Ma'achalos pg. 335, 73 s.v. v'achar).

[22] Several authorities make this diyuk, including the Minchas Yaakov (Soles L'Mincha 76, 1), Butchatcher Gaon (Daas Kedoshim - Yoreh Deah 89, 2), and the Aruch Hashulchan (Yoreh Deah 89, 2). Contemporary authorities who rely on not needing a full six hours include the Divrei Chaim zt"l (cited in Shu"t Divrei Yatziv, Likutim V'Hashmatos 69; see also Shu"t Yashiv Yitzchak vol. 5, 14), Rav Chaim Brisker zt"l (cited in sefer Torah L'Daas vol. 2, Beha'alochecha pg. 229, Question 5), the Matteh Efraim (Ardit; pg. 28, 4), Rav Aharon Kotler zt"l (cited in Shu"t Ohr Yitzchak vol. 1, Yoreh Deah 4), Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach zt"l (Kovetz Moriah, Teves 5756 pg. 79), Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt"l (Shu"t Yissa Yosef Orach Chaim vol. 2, 119, 5), and Rav Ovadia Yosef zt"l (Shu"t Yabea Omer vol. 1, Yoreh Deah 4, 13 & vol. 3, Yoreh Deah 3).

[23] Including Rabbeinu Yerucham (Sefer HaAdam, Nesiv 15, vol. 2, 27, pg. 137), Chamudei Daniel (Taaruvo vol. 2, 15), Shu"t Ginat Veradim (Gan HaMelech 154), Perach Shoshan (1, 1), Mikdash Me'at (on Daas Kedoshim ibid., 2), Yalkut Me'am Loez (Parshas Mishpatim pg. 889 - 890 s.v. shiur), Yad Yehuda (89, Pirush HaKatzet 1), Chofetz Chaim (Nidchei Yisrael Ch. 33), Rav Yisrael Yaakov Fischer zt"l (Shu"t Even Yisrael vol. 9, 126, 5), and Rav Chaim Kanievisky shlit"a (cited in sefer Doleh U'Mashkeh pg. 257). Several other contemporary authorities maintain that one should strive to keep the full six hours l'chatchila, but may be lenient in times of need, including Rav Moshe Feinstein zt"l (cited in Shu"t Divrei Chachamim Yoreh Deah 1, 1; and in private conversation with Rav Moshe's grandson Rabbi Mordechai Tendler), Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv zt"l (cited in Shu"t Avnei Yashpei vol. 5, 101, 3 & 4 and Ashrei Halsh Orach Chaim vol. 3, pg. 441, 10), Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner shlit"a (Kovetz M'Beis Levi on Yoreh Deah pg. 34, 3, & footnote 3) and Rav Menashe Klein zt"l (Shu"t Mishneh Halachos vol. 5, 97, 3).

[24] Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 89, 6). Others who rely on his opinion include the Gilyon Maharsha (ad loc. 3), Ikrei HaDa"t (Ikrei Dinim 10, end 5) and Minchas Yaakov (Soles L'Mincha 76, end 1).

[25] Including the Yad Efraim (Yoreh Deah 89, 1), Yeshuos Yaakov (ad loc., Pirush Hakatzet 1), Maharsham (Daas Torah ad loc.) and the Zeicher Yehosuf (Shu"t end 196), who allow one to rely on the Pri Chadash only if one is sick or in times of great need.

[26] Including the Pri Megadim (Yoreh Deah 89, Mishbetzos Zahav 1), Piskei Teshuva (ad loc. 3), Knesses HaGedolah (Hagchos on Tur, ad loc. 6 - 7), Kreisi U'Pleisi (ad loc. Pleisi 3), Chochmas Adam (40, 12), Chida (Shiyurei Bracha - Yoreh Deah 89, 3 - 4), Zivchei Tzedek (ad loc. 2), Ben Ish Chai (Year 2, Parshas Shelach 9), and Chaguras Shmuel (Yoreh Deah 89, 8).

[27] Rema (Yoreh Deah 89, 1), Maharai (Haghos Shaarei Dura 76, 2), Maharil (Minhagim, Hilchos Issur V'Hetter 5, s.v. ahal), Issur V'Hetter (40, 4). Although the Rashal (ibid.) and Taz (Yoreh Deah 89 2) cast aspersions on this custom, the Gr"a (Biur HaGr"a ad loc. 6) defends it as the Zohar's minhag as well to wait an hour between all milk and meat meals. Relevant to the proper custom in Amsterdam see seferMinhagei Amsterdam (pg. 20, 24 & pg. 52), Shu"t Yashiv Yitzchak (vol. 13, 25) and Shu"t Shav V'Rafa vol. 3, 114).

[28] There is no mention of a three hour wait in any traditional halachic source, save for one. And, although in Rabbeinu Yerucham's Kitzur Issur V'Hetter (39) found at the end of his main sefer, it does mention waiting 'Gimmel Shaos', it is an apparent misprint, as in the full sefer itself (Sefer HaAdam, Nesiv 15, vol. 2, 27, pg. 137) Rabbeinu Yerucham states unequivocally that one "must wait at least six hours"! Additionally, the source cited for his three hour quote is Rabbeinu Peretz, who also actually mandates waiting six hours (Hagchos on SMA"K 213). Moreover, it seems likely that Rabbeinu Yerucham is not the author of the Kitzur Issur V'Hetter attributed to him (see Rabbi Yisrael Ta Shma's article in Kovetz Sinai, Shevat - Adar 5729). For more on the topic of Rabbeinu Yerucham and three hours, see Rav Moshe Sternbuch's Orchos HaBayis (Ch. 7, note 45), Rav Chaim Kanievisky's opinion cited in Kovetz Nitzotzei Aish (pg. 860, 32), and Rav Asher Weiss's Shu"t Minchas Asher (vol. 1, 42, 2, s.v. u'mkivan). Renowned Rabbonim who served throughout Germany who wrote to keep six hours include Rav Yonason Eibeshutz zt"l (Kehillas AH"U - Kreisi U'Pleisi 89, 3), the Pri Megadim (Kehillos in Berlin and Frankfurt - Yoreh Deah 89, Mishbetzos Zahav 1), Rav Yosef Yuspa Haan zt"l (Noheg K'Tzon Yosef - Minhag Frankfurt, Hilchos Seu dah pg. 120, 4), and Rav Samsan Raphael Hirsch zt"l (Chovev vol. 4, Ch. 68, pg. 30).

[29] Mizmor L'David (Yoreh Deah 89, 6). Rav Hamburger's explanation is found in a letter written to mv"r Rav Yonason Wiener. See Shu"t Nachlas Pinchas (vol. 1, 36, 7) for a similar assessment. For other sevaros, see Rabbi Yaakov Skoczyals' Ohel Yaakov (on Basar BeChalav, 89, end footnote 1, quoting Rav Shimon Schwab zt"l) and Shu"t Mishna Halachos (vol. 16, end 9).

[30] Tosafos (Chullin 105a s.v. l'seudasa), Ravyah (1108, cited by the Rosh and Haghos Ashiri to Chullin Ch. 8, 5), Rema (Yoreh Deah 89, 1).

[31] Rabbeinu Tam's opinion is found in Tosafos (Chullin 104b s.v. oif).

[32] Kaf Hachaim (Falaj'i; Ch. 24, 25 - 26). This was also known to be the Arizal's custom (Taamei HaMitzvos of Rav Chaim Vital, Shaar HaMitzvos, Parshas Mishpatim). See also Shulchan HaTahor (173, 2), Ben Ish Chai (Year 2, Parshas Shelach 15), Shu"t Torah L'Shma (212) and Shu"t Shraga HaMeir (vol. 7, end 105). Some say (see Piskei Teshuvos end 494) that based on his writings on Parshas Mishpatim (s.v. lo sevashel), the Noam Elimelech must have also kept this stringency. However, it is known that there were several Gedolim who held this to mean to wait an actual 24 hours from eating meat before allowing milk products, including the Shla"h (cited by his chaver Rav Yosef Yuspa Haan in his Yosef Ometz, 137; interestingly, he writes that he personally could not keep it and instead waited a mere 12 hours!) and the Reishis Chochma (in his sefer Totzaos Chaim, Shaar 2, Hanhaga 45, pg. 32). Thanks are due to Rabbi Eliezer Brodt, author of Bein Kesseh L'Assor and Luketei Eliezer for pointing out these sources.

[33] See Daas Kedoshim (Yoreh Deah 89, 2), VaYaas Avraham (of Tchechnov; pg. 333, 51 & Ateres Zekainim ad loc. 155), Piskei Teshuva (vol. 3, 285), Piskei Halachos of HaGri"sh Elyashiv shlit"a (Yoreh Deah, Basar Bechalav pg. 53, 6; see also Shu"t Yissa Yosef - Orach Chaim vol. 2, 119, 6 and Ashrei Halsh - Orach Chaim vol. 3 pg. 442, 15, who claim that Rav Elyashiv zt"l only meant to be lenient after chicken and not actual meat).

[34] The story about the Chasam Sofer is cited in Zichron L'Moshe (pg. 79), Shu"t Divrei Yisrael (vol. 2, pg. 28, footnote) and in Shu"t Siach Yitzchak (399).

[35] Including Shu"t Siach Yitzchak (ibid.), Shu"t Teshuvos V'Hanhagos (vol. 1, 431), Kovetz M'Beis Levi (on Yoreh Deah pg. 34, 5; citing the opinion of Rav Shmuel HaLevi Wosner), Shu"t Beis Avi (vol. 3, Yoreh Deah beg. 108), Shu"t Mishna Halachos (vol. 7, 70), Shu"t Shulchan



HaLevi (vol. 1, 22, 10, 1), sefer Doleh U'Mashkeh (pg. 257 - 258 and footnote 15; citing the opinion of Rav Chaim Kanievsky, as well as his father, the Steipler Gaon). This leniency is also conspicuously absent from the vast majority of earlier authorities.

[36] Tosafos (Menachos 20b s.v. v'nifsal).

[37] Avos (Ch. 4, Mishna 1).

Disclaimer: This is not a comprehensive guide, rather a brief summary to raise awareness of the issues. In any real case one should ask a competent Halachic authority.

L'iluy Nishmas the Rosh HaYeshiva - Rav Chonoh Menachem Mendel ben R' Yechezkel Shraga, Rav Yaakov Yeshaya ben R' Boruch Yehuda, and I'zchus for Shira Yaffa bas Rochel Miriam and her children for a yeshua teikef u'miyad!

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subject: **[Rav Kook Torah]** BeHa'alotecha: Great Dreams  
BeHa'alotecha: Great Dreams  
BeHa'alotecha: Great Dreams  
Jacob\_dreaming

Unlike the unique clarity of Moses' prophecy, ordinary prophecy is communicated through the medium of visions and dreams:

"If someone among you experiences Divine prophecy, I will make Myself known to him in a vision; I will speak to him in a dream." (Num. 12:6)

Why Dreams?

Dreams, Rav Kook wrote, perform a vital function in the world. Great dreams are the very foundation of the universe. Dreams exist on many levels. There are the prescient dreams of prophets, and the conscious dreaming of poets. There are the idealistic dreams of great visionaries for a better world; and there are our national dreams of redemption - "When God will return the captivity of Zion, we will be like dreamers" (Ps. 126:1).

Of course, not every dream falls under the category of a great dream. Most dreams are petty or pointless, as it says, "Dreams speak falsely" (Zechariah 10:2). What determines whether a dream is meaningless or prophetic?

True Dreams and False Dreams

Those who are truly servants of God concentrate their aspirations and efforts on rectifying the world. When one's thoughts and actions are devoted exclusively to perfecting all of creation, then one's imagination will only be stimulated by matters that relate to the universal reality. The dreams of such individuals will naturally be of great significance. Their dreams relate to the inner truth of reality, to its past, present, and future.

But the imaginative faculties of people preoccupied with private concerns will be limited - like their waking thoughts and actions - to personal matters. What great truth could be revealed in imaginings that never succeeded in rising above the vain thoughts and desires of a self-centered individual?

The Sages expressed this idea allegorically by explaining that angels bring prophetic dreams and demons bring false dreams (Berachot 55b). What does this mean? Angels are constant forces in the universe, pre-arranged to perfect the world. True dreams relate to these underlying positive forces. Demons, on the other hand, are unholy forces rooted in private desires which are inconsistent with the overall universal order. False dreams are the resultant fantasies of such personal wishes.

The True Reality of Dreams

What would the world be like without dreams? Life immersed solely in materialism is coarse and bleak. It lacks the inspiring grandeur of expansive horizons; like a bird with clipped wings, it cannot raise itself above the bitter harshness of the present reality. We are only able to free ourselves from these shackles through the power of dreams.

Some foolishly take pride in being 'realists.' They insist on taking into account only the present state of the world - a partial and fragmented view of reality. In fact, it is our dreams which liberate us from the limitations of the current reality. It is our dreams that accurately reveal the inner truth of the universe.

As that future reality is revealed, we merit an increasing clarity of vision. Our perception begins to approach the *aspaklaria hame'irah*, the clear vision of Moses, with whom God spoke "face to face, in a vision not containing allegory, so that he could see a true image of God" (Num. 12:8).

(Sapphire from the Land of Israel. Adapted from Orot HaKodesh vol. I, p. 226; Ein Eyah vol. II, p. 279)

See also: Beha'alotecha: The Seven Lamps of the Menora

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Parashat Beha'alotecha: A Definition of Anivut

Excerpted from **Rabbi Norman Lamm's Derashot Ledorot: A Commentary for the Ages - Numbers**, co-published by OU Press and Maggid Books

Our sidra this morning introduces us, rather casually and incidentally, to one of the most important and highly celebrated virtues in the arsenal of religion - that of anivut. We read in today's portion, "And the man Moses was the most humble (anav me'od), above all the men that were upon the face of the earth" (Numbers 12:3). Whatever may be the particular translation of the Hebrew word anav, the idea that is usually imparted is that anivut is humility, a feeling by the individual that he lacks inner worth, an appreciation that he amounts to very little. Indeed, the author of Mesilat Yesharim, one of the most renowned works on Jewish ethics in all our literature, identifies the quality of anivut with shiflut - the feeling of inner lowliness and inferiority. According to this definition, then, the Torah wants to teach each of us to see ourselves in a broader perspective, to recognize that all achievements are very trivial, attainments mere boastfulness, prestige a silly exaggeration. If Moses was an anav, if he was humble and able to deprecate himself, how much more so we lesser mortals should be humble. However, can this be the real definition of this widely heralded quality of anivut?

We know of Moses as the *adon hanevi'im*, the chief of all the prophets of all times, the man who spoke with God "face to face" (Exodus 33:11). Do the words, "And the man Moses was the most humble" mean that Moses himself did not realize this? Does the anivut of Moses imply that he had a blind spot, that he failed to recognize what any school child knows? Does a Caruso\*\* have to consider himself nothing more than a choir boy, and an Einstein merely an advanced bookkeeper, in order to qualify for anivut? In order to be an anav, must one be either untruthful or genuinely inferior?

To a very great extent, modern psychology is concerned with the problem of inferiority. Deep down, people usually have a most unflattering appraisal of themselves. Many are the problems which bring them to psychologists and psychiatrists; yet all so often the underlying issue is the lack of self-worth. Are we, therefore, to accept the Jewish ethical prescription of anivut as an invitation to acquire an inferiority complex?

In addition, the definition of anivut as self-deprecation and humility does not fit into the context of today's sidra. The identification by the Torah of Moses as an anav is given to us as part of the story in which we learn of Aaron and Miriam, the brother and sister of Moses, speaking ill of Moses behind his back. They criticize him harshly because of some domestic conduct in his personal life. They are wrong, and they are punished by the Almighty. But what has all this to do with the humility of Moses? The substance of their criticism, namely, the domestic relations of Moses, is as unrelated to Moses' humility as it is to his artistic talents or his leadership ability.

Furthermore, the Talmud relates an exchange that is all but meaningless if we assume that anivut means humility. The Talmud (Sota 49a) tells us that when Rabbi Judah the Prince died the quality of anivut disappeared with him. When this was stated, the famous Rabbi Joseph disagreed. He said, "How can you say that when Rabbi Judah died anivut vanished? Do you not know that I am still here?" In other words - I am an anav!

Now, if anivut really means humility, does this make sense? Can one boast of his humility and still remain humble? Is it not of the essence of humility that one should consider that he possesses this virtue in himself?

It is for these reasons, and several more, that the famous head of the Yeshiva of Volozhin, popularly known as the Netziv, offers us another definition of anivut (in his HaAmek Davar) which, I believe, is the correct one. I would say that the definition the Netziv offers means, in English, not humility, but meekness. It refers not to self-deprecation but self-restraint. It involves not an untruthful lack of appreciation of one's self and one's attainments, but rather a lack of arrogance and a lack of insistence upon kavod, honor. To be an anav means to recognize your true worth, but not to impose the consequences upon your friends and neighbors. It means to appreciate your own talents, neither over-emphasizing nor under-selling them, but at the same time refraining from making others aware of your splendid virtues at all times. Anivut means not to demand that people bow and scrape before you because of your talents, abilities, and achievements. Anivut means to recognize your gifts as just that – gifts granted to you by a merciful God, and which possibly you did not deserve. Anivut means not to assume that because you have more competence or greater endowments than others that you thereby become more precious an individual and human being. Anivut means a soft answer to a harsh challenge, silence in the face of abuse, graciousness when receiving honor, dignity in response to humiliation, restraint in the presence of provocation, forbearance and a quiet calm when confronted with calumny and carping criticism.

With this new definition by the Netziv, the statement of Rabbi Joseph becomes comprehensible. When he was told that with the death of Rabbi Judah the Prince there was no more meekness left in the world, he replied with remarkable candor and truthfulness: You must be mistaken, because I, too, am meek. There is no boastfulness here – simply a fact of life. Some people are meek, some are not. If a man says, "I am humble," then obviously he is not humble; but if a man says, "I am meek," he may very well be just that. In fact, the Talmud tells us that Rabbi Joseph was at least the equal in scholarship of his colleague, Rabba, but that when the question arose who would head the great Academy in Babylon, Rabbi Joseph deferred to Rabba. And furthermore, all the years that Rabba was chief of the Academy, Rabbi Joseph conducted himself in utter simplicity, to the point where he did all his household duties himself and did not invite any artisan or laborer, physician or barber, to come to his house. He refused to allow himself the least convenience which might make it appear as if he were usurping the dignity of the office and the station occupied by his colleague Rabba. This is, indeed, the quality of meekness – of anivut.

And this meekness was the outstanding characteristic of Moses as revealed in the context of the story related in today's sidra. Here were Aaron and Miriam, both by all means lesser individuals than Moses, who derived so much of their own greatness from their brother, and yet they were ungrateful and captious and meddled in Moses' personal life. A normal human being, even a very ethical one, would have responded sharply and quickly. He would have confronted them with their libelous statement, or snapped some sharp rejoinder to them, or at the very least cast upon them a glance of annoyance and irritation. But, "The man Moses was the most meek, more so than any man on the face of the earth." Although aware of his spiritual achievements, of his role as leader of his people, even of his historical significance for all generations, Moses entertained no feelings of hurt or sensitivity, of injured kavod. There was in his character no admixture of pride, of arrogance, of harshness, of hyper-sensitivity. He had an utter lack of gall and contentiousness. He was, indeed, an anav, more so than any other individual on the face of the earth. And he was able to write those very words without self-consciousness! Hence he did not react at all to the remarks of his brother and sister. Therefore, God said that if Moses is such an anav that he does not defend himself against this offense, I will act for him!

The quality of anivut, as it has been defined by the Netziv, is thus one of the loveliest characteristics to which we can aspire. One need not nourish feelings of inferiority in order to be an anav. Indeed, the greater one is and knows one's self to be, the greater his capacity for anivut, for meekness. It is the person who pouts arrogantly and reacts sharply and pointedly when his ego is touched who usually reveals thereby feelings of inferiority and worthlessness, of deep shiflut. The individual who feels secure and who recognizes his achievements as real can afford to be meek, to be an anav.

For it is this combination of qualities – inner greatness and outer meekness – that we learn from none other than God Himself. The Talmud (Megilla 31a) put it this way: "Wherever your find mentioned the gedula, the greatness, of God, there also you will find mentioned His anivut." Thus, for instance, where we are told that God is mighty and awesome, immortal and transcendent, there too we learn that God is close to the widow and the orphan, the stranger and the sick, all those in distress, those overlooked, ignored and alienated from the society of the complacent. God's anivut certainly does not mean His humility or self-deprecation! It does mean His softness, gentleness, kindness – His meekness.

Here, then, is a teaching of Judaism which we can ill afford to do without. When we deal with husband or wife, with neighbor or friend, with children or students, with subordinates or employees – we must remember that the harsh word reveals our lack of security, and the impatient rejoinder shows up our lack of self-appreciation and self-respect. It is only when we will have achieved real gedula, true inner worth and greatness, that we shall learn that remarkable, sterling quality of anivut.

Let us leave the synagogue this morning aware of that mutual, reciprocal relationship between greatness and meekness. If we have gedula let us proceed to prove it by developing anivut. And if we doubt whether we really possess gedula then let us begin to acquire it by emulating the greatest of all mortals, Moses, and the immortal Almighty Himself, and practice anivut in all our human relations. If this anivut does not succeed at once in making us truly great, it at least will offer us the dividends of a better character, a happier life, more relaxed social relations, and the first step on the ladder of Jewish nobility of character.