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From: ravfrand-owner@torah.org on behalf of
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Sent: Wednesday, October 18, 2006 5:26 PM
Subject: Rabbi Frand on Parshas Bereshis

"RavFrاند" List - Rabbi Frand on Parshas Bereshis
Dedicated by Ephraim Sobol in loving memory of his father, Shlomo Mordechai ben Yaakov a"h

"If He Does Not Merit", Then "Opposite Him"

The Torah says, "It is not good for man to be alone, I will make for him a help-mate (eizer), opposite him (k'negdo)." [Bereshis 2:18] Rashi comments (based on Yevamos 63a) "If he merits, she will be his helpmate; if he does not merit, she will be opposite him."

The simple interpretation of this Gemara is that if a person merits finding the right wife, then he will have a spouse who will be his helper. If, however, he does not have that merit, he will have a wife with whom he is constantly arguing.

This simple interpretation is by no means the only interpretation of the Talmudic passage. I saw an interesting explanation in the Sefer Duda'ay Reuvain from Rabbi Reuvain Katz. Rabbi Katz writes that this pasuk [verse] is not referring to two different types of wives. The entire pasuk is referring to the classic "good" wife. The pasuk is explaining that a good wife must perform two roles for her husband, even though the two roles are sometimes opposite in nature to one another.

Certainly the Almighty created the institution of marriage because a person should have a help-mate throughout life. If a person is doing the right thing with his life, then the Almighty wishes that his wife should help him reach his goal. However, there is another aspect to why the Almighty created wives. Chazal comment on the pasuk "And He formed [vaYiven] the rib that he took from Adam into a woman and He brought her to Adam" [Bereshis 2:22] that a Binah Yeseirah [extra understanding] was given to women [Gemara Niddah]. Sometimes it is the function of the wife to use that Binah Yeseirah to tell her husband "You should excuse me my dear husband, but this is NOT the way to go!"

The classic example of this is the famous Gemara that states: "the wife of On ben Peles rescued him." [Sanhedrin 109b] Even though he had initially joined Korach's rebellion against Moshe, he bailed out in the middle. Why did he bail out? It was because his wife pointed out to him the folly of his ways: "Don't be an idiot. It does not matter to you in the least whether Moshe is the leader or Korach is the leader. You won't be the leader in either case." Even though this was a put down, it nevertheless saved him from destruction.

In the scenario above, Mrs. On ben Peles was not playing the role of the dutiful wife who always reinforces her husband's decisions and complements him on the wisdom of the path he has chosen. She was not

playing the role of the "help-mate"; she was playing the role of being "opposite." She saved him with her Binah Yeseirah, with her different way of looking at things. She saved him – physically and spiritually, in this world and in the next!

This, says the Duda'ay Reuvain, is the exact role of "Lo zacha – k'negdo" [if he does not merit, opposite him] to which the Gemara refers. "If he does not merit" – meaning he is not acting in the meritorious way that the Almighty would want him to act – then she should stand up "in opposition to him" and tell him that he is being a fool!"

Kayin Felt He Lost The First Competition In The History Of Mankind

In the story of Kayin and Hevel, Hashem accepted the offering brought by Hevel the Shepherd, but rejected the offering brought by Kayin the farmer. The Torah says that Kayin was very bothered by this and his expression showed his discontentment. At this point, Hashem speaks to Kayin and asks: "Why are you annoyed, and why has your countenance fallen?" [Bereshis 4:6]

Should it not have been obvious why Kayin was annoyed and why his face showed disappointment? After all, his offering was rejected! No one likes to be rejected, especially not by the Almighty!

We can obtain insight into this question from the following true story:

Someone came into the Beis Din [Court] of Rav Chaim Soloveitchik. The person was a shochet who had slaughtered an animal and had a question as to whether the animal was kosher or not. The judge examined the animal and ruled 'Treife!' (not Kosher!) In those days, it was not like today where arrangements are made with non-Kosher meat producers to accept the animals that are not fit for the Kosher trade. In those days, hearing that an animal one just slaughtered was 'treife' was a real financial setback. But, the shochet took the news stoically. He walked out of the Court without uttering a peep.

Several months later, the same Jew had a 'Din Torah' [monetary dispute] with another person. The dispute was over a non-substantial amount of money. Certainly, the sum involved was far less than the loss he sustained when the Court ruled that his animal was 'treife'. The judge listened to the arguments of both parties and again he ruled against this same person. The shochet heard the ruling and he 'lost it'. He began cursing the judge. He began cursing Rav Chaim. He became abusive and stormed out of the Court.

Those observers who remembered that several months earlier this person had lost a much greater amount without reacting in the slightest, could not figure out why he was so upset on this occasion. Rav Chaim explained the difference to them: "It was not the amount of money that upset him, it was the fact that now he lost and someone else won." In the previous case, it was not him against the cow. It was a ritual 'shaylah' -- is the cow kosher or treife? There was no 'winner' vs. 'loser' in that 'shaylah'. However, in the second case, Rav Chaim said, there was a winner and a loser. The fact that the other fellow won is what bothered him. That is what he could not accept.

This, Rav Chaim went on, explains the nature of G-d's question to Kayin: "Kayin, your offering was rejected and Hevel's offering was accepted. But, G-d asked him, 'Why has your countenance fallen?' Are you angry that your offering was rejected? Or, are you angry because your offering was rejected while your brother's offering was accepted?"

"If you are upset because I have not accepted your offering, you indeed have something to be upset about. But if what is bothering you is that 'Hevel won' -- the first game in the history of mankind -- that is a very inappropriate reaction."

This is what Rav Chaim told the Beis Din. It was not the money. It was the fact that there was a winner and a loser and people cannot stand to lose.

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These divrei Torah were adapted from the hashkafa portion of Rabbi Yissocher Frand's Commuter Chavrusah Tapes on the weekly portion: Tape # 520, Kavod and Oneg Shabbos. Tapes or a complete catalogue can be ordered from the Yad Yechiel Institute, PO Box 511, Owings Mills MD 21117-0511. Call (410) 358-0416 or e-mail tapes@yadyechiel.org or visit <http://www.yadyechiel.org/> for further information.

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From: TeaneckDaf@yahoo.com on behalf of crshulman@aol.com Sent: Friday, January 20, 2006 11:15 AM To: teaneckdaf@yahoo.com Subject: [TeaneckDaf] Misc. on Daf Pesachim 2-4

From: Daf Yomi [<mailto:dafyomi@yutorah.org>] Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2006 3:03 AM Subject: Daf Yomi - Pesachim 2-3 The Daily Daf Email, by Rabbi Daniel Feldman The Daily Daf Email, by Rabbi Daniel Feldman YUTorah, the online source of the Torah of Yeshiva University. Get more daf yomi insights, and hear thousands of other shiurim, by visiting www.yutorah.org. The Creation of Darkness The Talmud states that G-d created light and charged it with the commandments of the daytime, and darkness and charged it with the commandments of the nighttime. The Netziv (Meromei Sadeh) observes that the Talmud appears to be stating that darkness is a creation, and not merely the absence of light. This is the position of the Vilna Gaon (in Kol Eliyahu, based on Yeshayahu 45:7, and explaining Shemot 10:21), although many rishonim appeared to understand differently (such as Ramban, Shemot 4:11; Ran, Derashot 3; Rambam, Moreh Nevuchim, I, 73:7; see also R. Yosef Engel, Gilyonei HaShas to Yerushalmi Berachot, #47). The Sefer Chavatzet HaSharon al HaTorah (Shemot, pp. 102-103) discusses this and notes that even if one maintains that darkness is an active creation, that would only apply to the darkness of night, as indicated by the relevant sources; the darkness created by covering up one's windows during the daytime, for example, would merely be the absence of light. (See also Resp. L'Horot Natan, V, 55:3).

From: Meorot [<mailto:meorot@meorot.co.il>] Sent: Thursday, January 19, 2006 11:15 AM To: members@meorot.co.il Subject: Meorot Vol. 347

Pesachim 2a Is Darkness More than the Absence of Light?

The possuk written in regard to the creation of light and darkness is generally translated as, "Hashem called the light 'day,' and the darkness He called 'night'" (Breishis 1:5). The Gemara also understood it this way at first, and then reinterpreted it to mean, "Hashem summoned the light and commanded it to serve during the day. The darkness He summoned and commanded it to serve at night." This seems to imply that darkness is not merely the absence of light, but an entity unto itself, which was created to function at night. Primordial fire: In Maseches Chagiga (12a) the Gemara lists the ten things that were created on the first day of creation. Among them, the Gemara lists darkness, as we find in the possuk, "In the beginning, Hashem created.... and the land was waste and emptiness, and darkness was over the face of the deep" (Breishis 1:2). The Ramban (ibid) and Rambam (Moreh Nevuchim II, 30) explain that this does not refer to the absence of light, but to a primordial fire that emanated tremendous heat, but no light. The darkness we experience at night is referred to in a later possuk, "Hashem separated between the light and the darkness" (1:4). The Ramban here explains that this is not the dark fire discussed above, but simply the absence of light. Nevertheless, the Vilna Gaon writes that the absence of light must also be considered a creation, as we find in the possuk, "And He created darkness" (Yeshaya 45:7). When day breaks, and the sun light appears, it pushes back the darkness past the reaches of "where its rays of glorious light can reach" (Aderes Eliyahu, Bereishis 1:1). In attempting to define this darkness, the Vilna Gaon writes, "It is an entity unto itself, which the powers of our understanding cannot comprehend." The Maharsha (Tamid 32a) also follows this view. Neither day nor night: With this, the Brisker Rav zt"l explained the song from the end of the Haggada, "Draw near the day which is neither day nor night," which is based on the possuk in Zecharia (14:7) "There will be one day, which is known to Hashem, which will be neither day nor night. And it will be towards the time of nightfall, there will be light." If night is nothing more than the absence of daylight, how could there possibly be a time of neither day nor night? If it is not day, then by definition it is night? Rather, we must explain that the darkness of night is also a creation, and on that prophesized day we will see a wonderous time of neither day nor night. If we accept the premise that the darkness of night is an entity unto itself, we can apply this to explain the plague of darkness that struck the Egyptians. The possuk states, "And the darkness will be tangible" (Shemos 10:21). The darkness that normally settles at night was increased to such a terrible degree that light could not cut through it, and the Egyptians could not even move. A candle by day: R' Naftali Tzvi Yehuda Berlin

(HaEmek Davar, Bereishis 1:5) cites our Gemara that "darkness was summoned to serve at night," and asks why this was necessary? If the simple absence of light makes it impossible to see, why was it necessary to add the darkness, which is an element unto itself? What difference does the darkness make? He answers by citing the Talmud Yerushalmi, in regard to our sugya of bedikas chametz. The Talmud Bavli (8a) states that bedi-kas chametz must be performed at night, when candlelight is most potent. One might suggest that if he shuts his windows tightly such that no daylight can be seen, perhaps bedikas chametz may also be performed by day? In answer to this, the Ris-honim cite the Yerushalmi, in which R' Huna tells that during the times of the Chashmonaem, they hid from the Romans in underground caves where no daylight entered. In order to tell the difference between day and night, they would light a candle. If it glowed only faintly, they knew it was day. If it glowed brightly, they knew it was night. From here we see that the darkness of night causes candles to glow brighter. For this reason, bedikas chametz must be performed only at night. It is not the mere absence of light that causes candles to glow brighter. If so, they would glow with equal brightness in a dark place, both by day and by night. Rather, it is the unique creation of darkness that functions only at night, which causes the candles to glow brightly.

From: office@etzion.org.il on behalf of Yeshivat Har Etzion [office@etzion.org.il] Sent: Thursday, October 19, 2006 7:13 AM To: yhe-sichot@etzion.org.il Subject: SICHOT67 -01: Parashat Bereishit YESHIVAT HAR ETZION ISRAEL KOSCHITZKY VIRTUAL BEIT MIDRASH (VBM)

STUDENT SUMMARIES OF SICHOT OF THE ROSHEI YESHIVA

The htm version of this shiur is available at: <http://vbm-torah.org/archive/sichot67/01-67bereishit.htm>

Parashat BEREISHIT

SICHA OF HARAV YEHUDA AMITAL SHLIT"A

Why Did Kayin Sin?

I. WHAT LEADS TO CONFLICT?

Kayin said to Hevel, his brother; and it was, when they were in the field, that Kayin rose up to Hevel, his brother, and killed him. (Bereishit 4:8)

In this single verse, the Torah tells us of Hevel's murder at the hands of Kayin. Midrashim and commentators try to explain that which is omitted from the verse: what did Kayin say to Hevel before killing him? What made him so angry that he murdered his brother?

In Bereishit Rabba (22,7), Chazal offer three explanations, representing three different causes of conflict that remain relevant to this day.

1. What was their argument? They said: Come, let us divide the world. One took the land; the other took the movable possessions. The first said: "The ground upon which you stand belongs to me." The other said: "That which you are wearing belongs to me." The one said: "Take it off;" the other said: "Fly in the air." As a result, "Kayin rose up to Hevel his brother and killed him."

2. Rabbi Yehoshua of Sakhnin taught in the name of Rabbi Levi: Both took the land, and both took the movable possessions. What did they argue about? One said: "The Temple shall be built in my portion." The other said: "The Temple shall be built in my portion..." And as a result, "Kayin rose up to Hevel...."

3. Rabbi Huna taught: An extra twin sister was born together with Hevel. One said: "I shall take her, since I am the firstborn." The other said: "I shall take her, for she was born with me." As a result, "Kayin arose...."

The first interpretation views the conflict as a power struggle: Kayin demanded that Hevel get off his land, while Hevel insisted that Kayin relinquish his chattel. Indeed, to this day rulers who already have all that they need continue to struggle and wage war for power and control.

The second explanation casts the conflict in a religious light: Kayin and Hevel were arguing over who would have the Temple built in his half of the world. Today, too, we have first-hand experience of wars that break out because of religious zealotry and conflicts of faith.

The third explanation tells us that Kayin was born with a twin sister while Hevel was born with two twin sisters. Each brother took as a wife his

brother's twin, and then they fought over the third sister. While we may not have experience of wars breaking out over women, we are certainly familiar with the terrible reality of murders that take place as a result of this sort of conflict.

Through their interpretation of the mysterious background to the story of Kayin and Hevel, Chazal indicate the factors that generate conflict in every age. These sources of strife have been with us since the dawn of mankind, and we must exercise perpetual caution in order to avoid sinking into conflict.

II. KAYIN'S BATTLE AGAINST HIS EVIL INCLINATION

Following the murder, G-d asks Kayin, "Where is Hevel, your brother?" Kayin answers, "Am I then my brother's keeper?" Chazal (Tanchuma, Bereishit 9) explain that Kayin meant by this to absolve himself of responsibility for his act. God, Kayin claimed, had set up the conditions for this murder by creating Kayin with his urges and desires, and He had then provided the proximate cause by refusing Kayin's offering, while accepting that of Hevel.

Kayin seemingly has a point. The Gemara (Berakhot 31b) recounts that Eliyahu came before G-d with a similar claim: "You have turned their heart backwards" (I Melakhim 18:37) – it is You Who have caused Israel to sin, and therefore You should not punish them. Indeed, G-d accepts this argument and forgives the nation. Similarly, concerning the verse, "Rachel weeps over her children" (Yirmiyahu 31:14), Chazal explain that Rachel likewise claimed that it was G-d Who created the possibility of marrying two wives, and that He had thereby caused her distress and rivalry. Therefore, G-d should not punish Israel for engaging in idolatry – which is also compared to "rivalry." Here, too, Chazal conclude that G-d accepted her claim.

Why, then, does G-d not accept Kayin's argument? There seems to be a difference between the claim offered by Kayin and those offered by Eliyahu and Rachel. A person cannot complain about the fact that he has certain urges. Indeed, G-d created him in this way, and it is his job to grapple with them and to conquer them. Sometimes there are exceptional situations – famine and war, as in the time of Eliyahu, or extraordinary deception, as in the case of Rachel and Yaakov. In such situations, it really is impossible to blame a person who no longer remains faithful. We cannot argue with Holocaust survivors who have abandoned their faith, but we can argue with a regular person who rejects the yoke of Torah.

The existence of the evil inclination is not an excuse for sinning. In general, a person has to know that problems always exist, but his task is to battle against his base desires and to conquer them. If he fails to do so, then, like Kayin, he is deserving of punishment.

Translated by Kaeren Fish

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Science Wars

Rabbi Nosson Slifkin

Was life on earth created instantaneously by G-d, or did it evolve naturally over millions of years?

In the ongoing ferocious battles between creationists and evolutionists, the latter recently scored a point when Kansas school officials restored the theory of evolution to statewide curriculum.

Creationists, meanwhile, are enjoying a surge of power with their new image as "Intelligent Design Theorists." In Michigan, the House of Representatives has introduced legislation to put intelligent design on an equal basis with evolution. Backers of intelligent design organized university-sanctioned conferences at Yale and Baylor last year. The Discovery Institute, a Seattle-based research institute that promotes

conservative causes, organized a briefing on intelligent design last year on Capitol Hill for prominent members of Congress.

The theory of intelligent design posits that there are aspects of biology which cannot be accounted for by a natural explanation, and that these gaps in scientific theory prove that the world was designed by a Creator. Intelligent design proponents base themselves on far more substantial scientific evidence than Christian fundamentalists, who advocate a young earth and special creation.

Evolutionists, on the other hand, claim that these gaps do not exist or will soon be filled. They regard scientific theory as sufficient to explain most, if not yet all, natural phenomena. The evolutionists conclude ipso facto that there is no need to resort to invoking a Creator. Even those, like Stephen Jay Gould, who pay lip service to the equal value of religion, still marginalize it as an emotional experience devoid of factual basis.

NATURAL ORDER

The tragedy of this debate is that many well-meaning laypeople assume that they have to side fully with one group or the other. This is a mistake, because the philosophies of both positions are critically flawed.

The scientific enterprise itself is rooted in Judaism. Professor Paul Davies, a renowned physicist, writes: "The Jews conceived of G-d as the Lawgiver. This G-d, being independent of, and separate from, His creation, imposed laws upon the physical universe from without." It never occurred to pagans to look for regularities in nature.

Judaism always believed in perceiving G-d through studying the natural world. This never meant "there is no scientific explanation for phenomena." Rather, it meant understanding that G-d was the One who decreed the laws of science in the first place. (Miracles are traditionally considered a last resort, something to shake people into realizing to look beyond the laws of nature for their source. Jews perceive G-d primarily in His role as lawmaker, not lawbreaker.)

After a while, however, science forgot its roots. Giddy with its newfound ability to provide explanations for the mechanisms of natural phenomena, science forgot to ask who made these mechanisms. Only recently, with the success of science in discovering the extraordinary degree of order and unity inherent in nature, have some scientists begun to ask where these laws came from.

Einstein wrote to a colleague:

"You find it surprising that I think of the comprehensibility of the world... as a miracle or eternal mystery. But surely, a priori, one should expect the world to be chaotic, not to be grasped by thought in any way... Even if the axioms of the theory are posited by man, the success of such a procedure supposes in the objective world a high degree of order, which we are in no way entitled to expect a priori. Therein lies the 'miracle' which becomes more and more evident as our knowledge develops. And here is the weak point of positivists and professional atheists, who feel happy because they think that they have pre-empted not only the world of the divine but also of the miraculous."

To be sure, we have scientific explanations for phenomena. But this does not paint G-d out of the picture. On the contrary – it presents a new picture, that of the body of scientific law, for Him to have painted. Scientific laws are remarkable in their universality, symmetry, simplicity, and fortuitousness in producing a world that can sustain intelligent life.

Our grasp of the remarkable rationality of the universe is reaching its climax with the quest for a "Theory of Everything," an encapsulation of all the laws of nature into a simple and single unit. Professor John Barrow notes:

"The fact that such a unification is even sought tells us something important about our expectations regarding the Universe. Our monotheistic traditions reinforce the assumption that the Universe is at root a unity, that it is not governed by different legislation in different places."

Science and monotheism go hand-in-hand.

NO LAW WITHOUT A LAWGIVER

The discovery of scientific explanations was rooted in Judaism, is predicated by Judaism, and is hoped for by Judaism. The Mishnah states: "If there is no Torah, then there is no derech erez; if there is no derech erez, then there is no Torah." Derech erez has been translated in different ways, but Rabbi Yerucham Levovitz explains it to refer to natural law. Appreciating the role and rule of natural law is an essential prerequisite to appreciating the role and rule of the spiritual law of Torah.

The specifics of the various theories of evolution may or may not be correct. But it is irrelevant. Sooner or later, a viable theory to explain the formation of life will be found, just as we found theories to explain the motion of the planets and the patterns of rainfall. We can predict this, because we know that G-d works through a system of natural law. Not because, Heaven forbid, He has to, but because He chooses to. The creationists who look for G-d in miraculous events are committing a grave error. G-d's fingerprints are to be found in natural law as much as they are in supernatural law.

Rabbi Samson Raphael Hirsch, pre-eminent Jewish thinker of the 19th century, explains:

"Judaism is most anxious to make its adherents aware that all the phenomena of nature are subject to certain unchanging laws. Since Judaism itself is a system of laws through and through, it attaches a profound ethical value to the study of the natural sciences. Judaism considers it vitally important for its adherents to become aware that their entire universe is governed by well-defined laws, that every creature on earth becomes what it is only within the framework of fixed laws, and that every force in nature can operate only within specified limits.

Not by his whims of the moment but only by his own detailed knowledge of, and regard for, these laws can man make nature serve his purposes. Man himself, then, can exercise power only if he, in turn, obeys the laws set down for him and for his world."

Unlike those known as "creationists," Jews accept that science works. But unlike many scientists, we look deeper. For while it is praiseworthy to look for laws in nature, we should never disregard the Lawmaker. If and when evolutionary theory is perfected, it should, states Rabbi Hirsch, cause us to:

"give even greater reverence than ever before to the one, sole G-d Who, in His boundless creative wisdom and eternal omnipotence, needed to bring into existence no more than one single, amorphous nucleus, and one single law of 'adaptation and heredity' in order to bring forth, from what seemed chaos but was in fact a very definite order, the infinite variety of species we know today."

Rabbi Nosson Slifkin lectures on Judaism and the natural world at Ohr Somayach institutions and at zoos worldwide. His website is <http://www.zootorah.com>. This essay is adapted from Rabbi Nosson Slifkin's newest book, *The Science of Torah*, which discusses the laws of science, the creation of the universe, and the development of life. It can be purchased from your local Jewish bookstore or online from <http://www.feldheim.com>.

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Covenant & Conversation

Thoughts on the Weekly Parsha from

Sir Jonathan Sacks

Chief Rabbi of the United Hebrew Congregations of the British Commonwealth

[From 2 years ago - currently 5765]

<http://www.chiefrabbi.org/tt-index.html>

Bereishith Violence in the name of G-d

Religiously inspired violence has returned to haunt the world. Hostage-taking and hostage-killing, suicide bombings and massacres like the slaughter of schoolchildren in Beslan have become the face of terror in our age. Much has been spoken about weapons of mass destruction. Yet Beslan

was achieved by nothing more sophisticated than rifles and explosives. 9/11 was committed using box cutters and planes, not normally regarded as weapons at all. All along, we were looking in the wrong direction: at means instead of motives. The greatest weapon of mass destruction is the human heart.

The most eloquent words about our time are those at the end of today's sedra. Having created a universe of order, G-d saw human beings, his most precious creation, reduce it to chaos. The Torah then says: "G-d regretted that He had made man on earth and He was grieved to His very core." That is the ultimate refutation of those who claim that, in murdering the innocent, they are acting in the name of G-d.

The connection between religion and violence is set out at the beginning of the biblical story of mankind. The first two human children, Cain and Abel, bring an offering. Abel's is accepted, Cain's is not. The first recorded act of worship leads to the first murder, the first fratricide. Religion, the Torah implies, is anything but safe. At its best it lifts human beings to become "little lower than the angels." At its worst it leads them to become the most destructive form of life on earth.

What is the connection between religion and violence? There have been three major theories in the past hundred years. The first was Freud's. Freud believed that social pathology replicated the psychology of the individual, specifically the Oedipus complex. In ancient times, the children of the tribe, envious of the power of the tribal chief, murdered him. They were then haunted by guilt - what Freud called "the return of the repressed." The ghost of the victim became, as it were, the voice of G-d.

Rene Girard argued that religion was born in the attempt to deflect violence away from the group by turning it on an outsider. Social groups, especially those not ruled by law, are riven by vendettas. X kills Y. A member of Y's family kills X in revenge. X's family returns the violence. The feud continues, and the only way of ending it is to deflect it onto someone outside the group. Righteous anger is purged and order restored. For Girard, the primal religious act is human sacrifice. Its object is the scapegoat.

Postmodernists go further. They argue that the very act of self-definition involves the creation of an "other." For there to be an "us" there must be a "them," the people not like us. Humanity is divided into friends and strangers, brothers and others. The people not like us become the screen onto which we project our fears. They are seen as threatening, hostile, demonic. Identity involves exclusion which leads to violence.

The Torah's account is simpler and more profound. Reading the story of Cain and Abel, we ask ourselves: Why did G-d accept Abel's offering but not Cain's? Was not that very act the cause of violence in the first place?

However, the reason G-d rejected Cain's offering becomes clear in the words stated immediately after: "Cain became very angry and depressed." Imagine the following: you offer someone a gift. Politely, they refuse it. How do you respond? There are two possibilities. You can ask yourself, "What did I do wrong?" or you can be angry with the intended recipient. If you respond in the first way, you were genuinely trying to please the other person. If the second, it becomes retrospectively clear that your concern was not with the other but with yourself.

You were trying to assert your own dominance by putting the other in your debt: the so-called "gift relationship." Even among primates, the alpha male exercises power by distributing food, giving gifts. When the refusal of a gift leads to anger, it shows that the initial act was not altruism but a form of egoism. I give, therefore I rule.

That is what sacrifices were in the pagan world: attempts to appease, placate or bribe the G-ds, thereby coercing or manipulating them into doing my will - sending rain, or victory in battle, or restoring past imperial glories. This is the exact opposite of what the Torah sees as true faith: humility in the face of G-d, respect for the integrity of creation, and reverence for human life, the only thing that bears the image of G-d.

There is no way of telling the difference externally. There can be two offerings - Cain's and Abel's - that look alike. They are both acts of worship,

both superficially the same, yet between them there is all the difference in the world. One is an act of self-effacement in the presence of the creator. The other is a Nietzschean will to power. How do you tell the difference? By the presence of anger when things don't turn out as you wished.

The story of Cain and Abel is the most profound commentary I know on the connection between religion and violence. Violence is the attempt to impose your will by force. There are only two ways of living with the guilt this involves: either, like Nietzsche, by denying G-d, or, like Cain, by telling yourself that you are doing G-d's will. Both end in tragedy. The only alternative - the Bible's alternative - is to see human life as sacred. That remains humanity's last and only hope.

From: **Rabbi Shlomo Riskin's Shabbat Shalom Parsha Column**
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Wednesday, October 18, 2006 7:30 AM To: Rabbi Shlomo Riskin's Shabbat
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Shlomo Riskin

Shabbat Shalom: Parshat Bereishit (Genesis 1:1-6:8) By Shlomo Riskin Efrat, Israel – What is the most distinctive feature of the human being which sets him/her apart from the animal world and places humanity in a sui generis, unique position in this very complex universe in which we live? The philosopher Descartes taught, "Cogit, ergo sum," "I think, therefore I am," suggesting that it is the gift of intelligence which is humanity's most vital possession; my revered teacher Rav J.B. Soloveitchik once maintained that it is the human ability – and necessity – to take responsibility for his/her own life as well as for the lives around him/her which is the most important aspect of the human personality. But it is Aristotle's definition which I believe is closest to the Biblical outlook when he describes the human being as a social animal, or an animal which has the ability to communicate with others. I would like to begin my analysis of this most significant aspect of the human character with a fascinating commentary of R. Isaac Abrabanel (15th Century Spain). This week's portion of Bereishit, the renewal of our yearly cycle of Biblical readings, tells the story of the Creation of Adam, the first human being, and from Adam's very essential self, Eve. "And the Lord G-d caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man and he slept; and He took one of his sides and closed up the flesh beneath it," thereby fashioning the first woman (Genesis 2:21). What follows this account (in Chapter 3 of Genesis) is the fall of man and woman with their sin of eating the fruit of the tree of Knowledge of good and evil – without any record of conversation between them either before or after they succumb to temptation. Indeed, Adam only voices recriminations against the "woman whom you gave to me, she gave from the tree and I ate" (Genesis 3:12). And at this point we are told of the punishment meted out by G-d to the first man and woman, and then to the serpent. Adam then continues his task of naming the various creatures in the world: "And Adam called the name of his wife Havah, because she is the mother of all human beings." Now the Hebrew hay means life, but havah may well be from a similar but nevertheless somewhat different root word; the Abrabanel suggests that hvh means a communicator, a woman of words, as we find in Psalm 19:3 ("Night unto night communicates- yehaveh – knowledge); in Job (36:2) and even in our modern usage of the Hebrew mahvah as a verbal gesture of good-will. And clearly hay (life) and havah (communication) are inter-related linguistically and ideationally if indeed the essence of human life is the ability to communicate. The inter-relationship between these two ideas is likewise to be found in an earlier verse in our Torah portion: "And the Lord G-d formed the human being (Adam) dust from the earth, and He breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; the human being then became a nefesh hayah, or a living soul" (Gen 2:7). The image depicted in the Bible is very different from that of Michelangelo's portrait of the creation of man in the Sistine Chapel in Rome, where he painted the hand of G-d (as it were) touching the hand of the first human being, finger to finger. Apparently Michelangelo, a genius sculptor and painter, felt his creativity in his fingers and transfixed that power-in-the-hand to the Divine as well.

But such is not the Biblical image, which is far more profound. In the words of the Sacred Zohar, cited in the first chapter of the Tanya of Rav Shneur Zalman of Liady, founder of Habad (Lubavitch) Hassidism, "Anyone who exhales, exhales from the essence of his innermost being." Hence, G-d's breathing into dust of the earth in his Creation of the human being is tantamount to saying that there resides in the deepest recesses of every human being a portion of the Divine from on high, a spark of G-d Himself. This is the eternal aspect of the human being which can never be subject to death or destruction; this is the part of the human personality which enables him/her to create, to love, to transcend him/herself. Targum Onkelos, the early and accepted Aramaic translation - interpretation of the Bible written by a righteous proselyte who was a leading disciple of Rabbi Akiba, translates the concluding two words of the

verse, nefesh haya , as ruah memalela, a speaking or communicating spirit. Apparently Targum understood the internal connection between human life (hayah) and human speech (havah), two very closely allied verb and noun forms. No wonder then that the part of the human organism which allows for speech, the larynx, is anatomically connected to the part of the human organism which enables us to breathe, the trachea. Human speech and communication is a direct out-growth of the breath of the Divine, which informs every human being, which enables him/her to live (the breath of life), and which defines him/her as a shadow or image of G-d (tselem E-lohim). And it is precisely because each and everyone of us has within him/her self a spark of the Divine that each and everyone of us is related to each other in an inextricable bond of unity; the part of G-d within us all truly makes us all part of the One and part of each other. And if we are related to each other, we must relate (communicate) to each other as loving relatives, as part of one greater organism of G-d and humanity united. This is the deepest meaning of the verse, "you must love your neighbor like yourself, I am the Lord" (Leviticus 19). Since G-d is part of each of us, we are all part of each other, and must therefore communicate with each other in love. Unless we learn and practice this, there is no future for humanity. Shabbat Shalom

From: hamaayan-owner@torah.org on behalf of Shlomo Katz
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Bereishit

Hamaayan / The Torah Spring

Edited by **Shlomo Katz**

Bereishit Volume 21, No. 1 29 Tishrei 5767 October 21, 2006

Sponsored by the Parness family in memory of Anna Parness a"h

With gratitude to Hashem and prayers for His continued blessing, we now begin the twenty-first parashah cycle of Hamaayan.

Rashi's well-known comment at the beginning of Bereishit states: "The Torah which is the Law book of Yisrael should have begun with the verse (Shmot 12:1), 'This month shall be for you the first of the months,' which is the first mitzvah given to Yisrael. Why, then, does it begin with Creation? Because of the thought expressed in Tehilim (111:6), 'He declared to His people the strength of His works, in order that He might give them the heritage of the nations.' Should the peoples of the world say to Yisrael, 'You are thieves, because you took by force the lands of the seven nations of Canaan,' Yisrael may reply to them, 'All the earth belongs to G-d. He created it and gave it to whom He pleased. When He willed, He gave it to them, and, when He willed, He took it from them and gave it to us.'"

R' Yaakov Moshe Charlap z"l (rabbi of Yerushalayim's Sha'arei Chesed neighborhood and rosh ha'yeshiva of Yeshivat Merkaz Harav; died 1951) asks: Why does the verse say, "He declared to His people the strength of His works." Shouldn't the declaration that G-d created the world and gave Eretz Yisrael to the Jewish people have been made to the nations of the world? He answers: The midrash must speak first and foremost to the Jewish People because only when the Jewish People express no doubt that Eretz Yisrael is theirs will the nations of the world also recognize that fact. If the Jewish People have doubts, they can never hope for understanding from the nations.

R' Charlap continues: The same thing is true vis-a-vis all the mitzvot. This is why the snake asked Chava (Bereishit 3:1), "Did G-d indeed say, 'You shall not eat of any tree of the garden?'" All that was necessary to cause Chava to sin was to cause her to question her beliefs.

We read (Yishayah 60:21), "Your people, they are all righteous; forever shall they inherit the Land; a branch of My planting, My handiwork, to be glorious." Only when we consider ourselves glorious because we are His handiwork can the entire nation be righteous, explains R' Charlap. (Mei Marom VIII p.21)

"Hevel became ('va'yehi) a shepherd, and Kayin was ('hayah) a tiller of the ground." (Bereishit 4:2)

R' Yisrael Friedman z"l (1797-1850; the Rizhiner Rebbe) observes: Our Sages say that "va'yehi" is an expression of sorrow, while "hayah" is an

expression of joy. (The Gemara supports this interpretation from various sources.) Hevel was a shepherd, but he regretted it. He would have preferred to be serve Hashem without distractions. Kayin was a farmer, and he was happy. He preferred his work to serving Hashem. Perhaps this is why Hashem accepted Hevel's offering and not Kayin's. (Quoted in Otzrot Tzaddikei U'geonei Ha'dorot)

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<http://www.anshe.org/parsha.htm#parsha> Parsha Page

by **Fred Toczek** - A Service of Anshe Emes Synagogue (Los Angeles)
Bereshis 5757 & 5762

BEREISHIS

I. Summary

A. Creation. The Torah begins by stating that in the beginning Hashem created from nothingness the heaven and earth. However, the earth was yet void and without shape or order. During the first six days, Hashem shaped, made and placed everything in the universe in its proper functioning position. The order of this Divine task was as follows:

First Day: Creation of light and darkness;

Second Day: Arrangement of the "Rokiah" to separate between the heavenly and earthly waters;

Third Day: Separation of water and land (and completion of the creation undertaken on the second day); vegetation;

Fourth Day: Creation and placement of the sun & moon in the sky;

Fifth Day: Creation of sea life and birds;

Sixth Day: Creation of reptiles, animals and man; and

Seventh Day: Hashem "rested" from His work, and sanctified the seventh day as Shabbos

B. Creation of Man/The Tree of Knowledge. Hashem decided that it wasn't good for man to be alone, so He brought all of the animals and birds before Adam ("Odom"), who named each of them but couldn't find a mate for himself among them. Hashem thus put Adam to sleep, removed one of his ribs and closed up the wound with flesh. He shaped, developed and completed the rib, making it into Eve ("Chava") who He brought before Adam. Hashem placed them into the Garden of Eden, where they were free to eat anything except the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. However, Eve fell prey to the nochosh (evil serpent), who convinced her to eat the forbidden fruit and give some to Adam. As a result, they were punished by Hashem, by being evicted from the Garden of Eden and forced to live as human beings as we know it (i.e., having to toil for their sustenance and experience death and the pain of childbirth); the serpent was punished by having to crawl on the ground and eat the dust of the earth.

C. Cain/Abel (Hevel). Adam and Eve had two sons, Cain (who became a tiller of the land) and Abel (who became a shepherd). Both Cain and Abel brought offerings to Hashem -- Abel's offering was sincere and of his finest flock; Cain's offering was insincere and of the worst portions of his crop. Hashem only accepted Abel's offering. Cain, greatly angered and embarrassed, killed Abel while they were in the field. Asked by Hashem about Abel's whereabouts, Cain replied "Am I my brother's keeper?" Hashem severely punished Cain for his actions, cursing him to be a wanderer over the face of the earth.

D. Subsequent Generations/Prelude to the Flood. Adam and Eve had a third son, Sheis, and additional children. As each new generation reproduced, the numbers of mankind increased. There were ten generations from Adam to Noah, including two Tzadikim (Chanoch & Mesushelech). However, man turned to evil and practiced immortality and violence. Hashem began reconsidering His act of populating the world with mankind. Noah, however, found favor in Hashem's eyes.

II. Divrei Torah

A. Lilmode Ul'lamed (Rabbi Mordechai Katz)

Proof of Hashem's Hand in Creation. When the Rambam taught that the world was created by Hashem, a heretic disagreed. Instead, said the heretic, the world had existed forever and no one created it. The Rambam asked the man to leave the room for several moments. When he was asked to re-enter, a beautiful painting hung on the wall. The heretic admired the painting and asked who had painted it. The Rambam answered that he had spilled some paint on a canvas and that painting had taken shape by itself. The heretic laughed mockingly and said "that is impossible; just by looking at the perfect design of the painting, anyone can tell that someone painted it carefully and purposefully." The Rambam responded "the same is true of the world;

when examining how perfectly all its features exist and interact, anyone can tell that it was formed by an All-Knowing Creator".

B. Growth Through Torah (Rabbi Zelig Pliskin)

1. Hashem sheds light even at the greatest moment of darkness. "And the earth was desolate and void, and darkness was upon the waters . . . and Hashem said, Let there be light and there was light". The Chofetz Chaim taught that these verses serve as a tremendous inspiration to us in times of darkness. At the beginning of creation the world was completely dark, but one statement by Hashem was sufficient to light up the world. Keeping in mind that Hashem has the power to shine forth a magnificent light will help us overcome moments of despair. Whenever you feel darkness, repeating the words "Let there be light" will allow the light of Hashem to penetrate your heart and soul, giving you the ability to deal with any hardship from a position of spiritual strength.

2. Recognizing that what we have is "very good". "And Hashem saw all that He made, and behold it was very good." The Baal Shem Tov showed his disciples how a person's situation can be exactly the same, but one day he will be full of complaints while on another he will be full of joy. To illustrate the point, he called in a water-carrier and asked him how things were going. "I'm getting older and I feel so weak," the man replied. "My children constantly study and don't help me out. I have to support my in-laws, and find the financial obligations a real burden. My wife is so sickly, and I feel like I'm falling apart." On another day, the Baal Shem Tov asked him again how things were going. With a big smile, he replied "I am so grateful to Hashem for all of His kindness. Even though I am old, I am not only able to support myself, but I am even able to support the Torah study of my children and in-laws who study with such diligence. My wife is wonderful to me; with great sacrifice she makes me so happy." We constantly choose how to view our life situation; even though nothing external has changed, we can still view our life in very positive ways.

3. One must overcome worrying about the future in order to appreciate what he/she has. Rashi (Bereishis 6:6) cites as an analogy a concept that is crucial for living a happy life. When a child is born, his/her parents are happy. Why aren't they sad that eventually the child will die? The answer is that one must live in the present. At a time of joy, experience the joy of that moment. Do not allow future sorrows to destroy the positive aspects of the present. Learning to live in the present frees oneself from much needless misery and suffering.

C. Torah Studies (the Lubavitcher Rebbe, Rabbi Menachem M. Schneerson, z"l)

The First Creation "And G-d said, Let there be light, and there was light." Why was light the first creation (for it has no value in itself; its usefulness depends on the existence of other things which are illuminated by it or which benefit from it)? If it was simply preparation for things to come, it could have been created later -- i.e., right before plants (which grow by the help of light) or animals (who can distinguish light and darkness). The purpose of the world that Hashem was to create (a place where the Divine light would be hidden in the heavy shrouds of material existence) was that it should be purified and the pristine light of G-d restored. Since light was thus the purpose of creation, it was created on the first day. "Light," in turn, is the purpose of each Jew: Each Jew must transform his/her situation and environment to light, not merely by driving out the darkness (evil) by refraining from sin, but by changing the darkness itself to light by positive commitment to good. The world was created so that Israel through Torah should turn it into the everlasting light of G-d's revealed presence, in the Messianic fulfillment of Isaiah's word: "the sun shall no more be your light by day, nor for brightness shall the moon give you light: But the L-rd shall be for you a light everlasting."

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by **Rav Ronnie Ziegler**

LECTURE #15: "The Lonely Man of Faith"

Part 1 - Presenting the Problem In this penetrating and original work, Rav Soloveitchik tackles a number of major issues, the central ones being: A) man's dual role in the world, and B) the possibility of religious existence in modern, largely secular society. Along the way, he offers startling insights on a host of other topics. Some of these ideas develop themes we have already encountered in his other writings; here he places them into broader perspective. Other ideas will be familiar to those who have read "Halakhic Man" and especially "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham." In this sense, "The Lonely Man of Faith" occupies a central place in the Rav's writings and can be regarded as an overture to his entire oeuvre. Instead of focusing on strands of his thought which appear here and tracing their development, I will attempt in the coming lectures to bring into sharp focus this essay's central line of argument. The essay's rich range of ideas makes reading it a challenging and exhilarating endeavor, but at the same time it often serves to obscure the main point. As we will see below, "The Lonely Man of Faith" is finely crafted, with a clear structure and progression of ideas. In today's lecture, I would like to examine closely

the Rav's introductory comments, where he delineates both the goal and the method of this work. Once we understand how the Rav himself defines the issue he wishes to address, we will use this understanding to guide our reading of the rest of the essay, and at the end we will return to see how he answers the questions he poses at the beginning. [Note: I will refer to "The Lonely Man of Faith" interchangeably as an essay and as a book, since it was originally published in essay form in the journal Tradition (Summer 1965) and subsequently in book form (Doubleday, 1992; Aronson, 1996 - the Aronson edition is merely an offprint of the Doubleday edition). Page and chapter references will follow the Doubleday-Aronson version because these printings are much more readily available than the original issue of Tradition.]

ADAM I AND ADAM II Let me start by doing something unpardonable: trying to sum up the main argument of "The Lonely Man of Faith" in a few short paragraphs. Although this will perforce be inadequate and oversimplified, I think it will aid us greatly in understanding the Rav's characterization of the essay in its opening section. (If this summary is enigmatic, fear not; we will later examine these ideas at length.) Rav Soloveitchik proposes that the two accounts of the creation of man (in chapters 1 and 2 of Bereishit) portray two types of man, two human ideals. In their approaches to God, the world and the self, these roughly parallel the two personae we examined in "Majesty and Humility" (lectures #5 and #6). The first, whom we will term Adam I, is guided by the quest for dignity, which is a surface social quality attained by control over one's environment. He is a creative and majestic personality who espouses a practical-utilitarian approach to the world. Adam II, on the other hand, is guided by the quest for redemption, which is a quality of the depth personality attained by control over oneself. He is humble and submissive, and yearns for an intimate relationship with G-d and with his fellow man in order to overcome his sense of incompleteness and inadequacy. These differences carry over to the type of community each one creates: the "natural work community" (Adam I) and the "covenantal faith community" (Adam II). G-d not only desires the existence of each of these personality types and each of these communities, but actually bids each and every one of us to attempt to embody both of these seemingly irreconcilable types within ourselves. We must attempt to pursue both dignity and redemption. The demand to be both Adam I and Adam II leads to a built-in tension in the life of each person responsive to this call; and because one lives with a constant dialectic, a continual oscillation between two modes of existence, one can never fully realize the goals of either Adam I or Adam II. Unable to feel totally at home in either community, man is burdened by loneliness. Since this type of loneliness is inherent to one's very being as a religious individual, the Rav terms it "ontological loneliness" (ontological = relating to existence). In a sense, this kind of loneliness is tragic; but since it is willed by God, it helps guide man to realize his destiny and is ultimately a positive and constructive experience. The contemporary man of faith, however, experiences a particular kind of loneliness due to his historical circumstances, and this "historical loneliness" is a purely negative phenomenon. Modern man, pursuant to his great success in the realm of majesty-dignity, recognizes only the Adam I side of existence, and refuses to acknowledge the inherent duality of his being. Contemporary society speaks the language of Adam I, of cultural achievement, and is unable or unwilling to understand the language of Adam II, of the uniqueness and autonomy of faith. Worse, contemporary Adam I has infiltrated and appropriated the realm of Adam II; he presents himself as Adam II, while actually distorting covenantal man's entire message. The details of this analysis, as well as possible courses of action in light of it, will occupy us in the next several lectures.

A UNIVERSAL MESSAGE We are now in a position to understand the Rav's description of the nature of "The Lonely Man of Faith" in its opening paragraphs. Firstly, from the very title, it is evident that the essay's message is universal. "The Lonely Man of Faith" refers to any religious faith, not just to Judaism. The dilemma of faith in the modern world applies equally to all religions (or at least to Western religions, which were the Rav's concern; he had little interest in Eastern religion). It should also be noted that the essay addresses men and women equally; nowhere here does the Rav distinguish between them. The word "man" in the title should therefore be understood as "person." The essay's universalistic bent is further expressed in the choice of the text which stands at its center: the story of the creation of Adam and Eve, the parents of ALL mankind. Significantly, references to Judaism and Jewish sources appear almost exclusively in the footnotes. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the essay originated in a series of lectures sponsored by the National Institute of Mental Health, delivered before an audience comprised of both Jews and non-Jews.

A PERSONAL DILEMMA In the essay's opening sentence, Rav Soloveitchik informs us that he will not address the intellectual challenges which modernity poses to faith, but rather something much more basic: the challenge which modernity poses to the EXPERIENCE of faith. He will focus on "a human life situation in which the man of faith as an individual concrete being ... is entangled" (p.1). In this sense, the essay is not a work of abstract theology but rather "a tale of a personal dilemma," whose power derives from the fact that it is based on "actual situations and experiences with which I have been confronted" (ibid.). In a striking characterization, unparalleled in other classic works of Jewish thought, the Rav concludes: "Instead of

talking theology, in the didactic sense, eloquently and in balanced sentences, I would like, hesitatingly and haltingly, to confide in you, and to share with you some concerns which weigh heavily on my mind and which frequently assume the proportions of an awareness of crisis." (pp.1-2) Furthermore, he confesses, he does not have a solution to the problem he will pose, "for the dilemma is insoluble" (p.8). Why, then, does he bother to present the problem at all? He offers two reasons: 1. "All I want is to follow the advice given by Elihu the son of Berachel of old who said, 'I will speak that I may find relief;' for there is a redemptive quality for an agitated mind in the spoken word and a tormented soul finds peace in confessing" (p.2). 2. "...[T]he defining itself [of the dilemma] is a worthwhile cognitive gesture which, I hope, will yield a better understanding of ourselves and our commitment" (p.8). Why is the dilemma insoluble? Let us first consider the Rav's definition of the dilemma, and then we will return to this question.

BEING LONELY AND BEING ALONE

"The nature of the dilemma can be stated in a three-word sentence. I am lonely." (p.3) Here we must distinguish between being alone and being lonely. Aloneness means lacking love and friendship; this is an entirely destructive feeling. Loneliness, on the other hand, is an awareness of one's uniqueness, and to be unique often means to be misunderstood. A lonely person, while surrounded by friends, feels that his unique and incommunicable experiences separate him from them. This fills him with a gnawing sense of the seemingly insurmountable gap which prevents true communion between individuals. While painful, this experience can also be "stimulating" and "cathartic," since it "presses everything in me into the service of God," the Lonely One, who truly understands me. As mentioned above, loneliness - the sense of the uniqueness and incommunicability of one's inner life - can have two causes: ontological and historical. These two forms of loneliness, while stemming from the same basic dichotomy in the human personality, are experienced differently and must be addressed separately.

ONTOLOGICAL LONELINESS: EXPERIENCING INNER CONFLICT The ontological loneliness of the man of faith derives from the very nature of his religious experience. In a phrase that may seem surprising at first, the Rav characterizes this experience as "fraught with inner conflicts and incongruities;" he also calls it "antinomic" and "paradoxical" (p.2). ("Antinomic" means contradictory, or rather self-contradictory in our context. This is not to be confused with "antinomian," which denotes refusal to recognize the authority of moral law. While the Rav loved a good antinomy, he hated antinomianism, which espoused rejection of Halakha.) This description of the religious experience initially strikes us as odd because modern man often equates religious belief with tranquility and peace of mind. However, bearing in mind the summary of the Rav's argument at the beginning of this lecture, it should be clear why Rav Soloveitchik totally disagrees with this approach. In his view, G-d demands of man to live in two seemingly incompatible modes of existence - that of Adam I and that of Adam II. Thus, one who heeds God's dual demand lives a life full of dialectical tension.

NO ENCHANTED ISLAND However, it is important to understand that this tension does not derive only from the requirement to be both Adam I and Adam II, but is inherent within Adam II himself, within "Religious Man" and the religious realm proper. Religious man himself, and not only the compound persona of majestic and religious man, is an antithetical character. He constantly grapples with dichotomous concepts and experiences located at the heart of religious existence: "temporality and eternity, [divine] knowledge and [human] choice (necessity and freedom), love and fear (the yearning for G-d and the flight from His glorious splendor), incredible, overbold daring and an extreme sense of humility, transcendence and God's closeness, the profane and the holy, etc." (Halakhic Man, p.142). Many contemporary popularizers of religion portray faith as offering ready comfort and easy inner harmony to believers, providing a refuge from the discord, doubts, fears and responsibilities of the secular realm. From his earliest writings until his latest, Rav Soloveitchik took umbrage with this shallow and false ideology, which he found to be particularly prevalent in America. Religion does not provide believers with instant tranquility, but rather forces them to confront uncomfortable dichotomies; it is "a raging, clamorous torrent of man's consciousness with all its crises, pangs, and torments" (ibid.). Religion is not less demanding than secularity, but rather more so. It does not offer an escape from reality, but rather provides the ultimate encounter with reality. It suggests no quick fixes, but rather demands constant struggle in order to attain spiritual growth. As the Rav so memorably put it, "Kedusha (sanctity) is not a paradise but a paradox" ("Sacred and Profane," p.8; see also "For Further Reference" below, #1.)

HISTORICAL LONELINESS: THE CONTEMPORARY CRISIS Thus far we have discussed the ontological loneliness of the man of faith, the crises and tensions inherent in religious existence. However, Rav Soloveitchik informs us that in this essay his "prime concern" is not ontological loneliness but rather the man of faith's experience of historical loneliness, in which "a highly sensitized and agitated heart, overwhelmed by the impact of social and cultural forces, filters this root awareness [of ontological loneliness] through the medium of painful, frustrating emotions"

(p.6). Rav Soloveitchik does not wish to focus on a general, timeless theological issue, but instead to address the predicament of the CONTEMPORARY man of faith who, "due to his peculiar position in our secular society ... lives through a particularly difficult and agonizing crisis" (p.6). A sharp and prescient social critic, Rav Soloveitchik is here keenly sensitive to the changes society has undergone and for the need to reassess the role of the man of religion within it. "Let me spell out this passionate experience of contemporary man of faith [passional = expressing suffering]. "He looks upon himself as a stranger in modern society which is technically minded, self-centered, and self-loving, almost in a sickly narcissistic fashion, scoring honor upon honor, piling up victory upon victory, reaching for the distant galaxies, and seeing in the here-and-now sensible world the only manifestation of reality. What can a man of faith like myself, living by a doctrine which has no technical potential, by a law which cannot be tested in the laboratory, steadfast in his loyalty to an eschatological vision whose fulfillment cannot be predicted with any degree of probability ... - what can such a man say to a functional utilitarian society which is saeculum-oriented and whose practical reasons of the mind have long ago supplanted the sensitive reasons of the heart?" (pp.6-7) The Rav is certainly not anti-intellectual or opposed to technological advances (see, e.g., lecture #14). What he is asserting here is the autonomy of faith. Our society speaks in pragmatic and utilitarian terms, and expects religion to justify itself in these categories. But the value of religion, the Rav believes, is independent of its practical utility, its usefulness in helping man attain dignity and majesty. Rather, faith is a response to a divine summons, a call to submit ourselves to God. Its meaning and value far exceed justification by the human intellect. However, pragmatic modern man - whether secular or religious - works only with categories of the intellect, not realizing their limited purview. The danger, then, is not just that secularists have ceased to understand the man of faith; it is that adherents of religion have ceased to understand themselves. We can now appreciate the true import of the concluding sentences of the Rav's introduction: "If my audience will feel that these interpretations are also relevant to their perceptions and emotions, I shall feel amply rewarded. However, I shall not feel hurt if my thoughts will find no response in the hearts of my listeners." (p.9) The Rav is not being coy or diffident here. Rather, as Rav Jonathan Sacks points out (see Reference section, #2), this is "an expression characteristic of the man of faith in the modern world. He no longer speaks the shared language of society. ... How then is he to communicate? Simply by speaking out of his inner situation and hoping to find an echoing response in his audience." Thus, the man of faith's uncertainty about his ability to communicate lies at the very heart of his problem.

THE INSOLUBLE PROBLEM Returning now to our question of why the dilemma this essay poses is insoluble, we must offer a dual response. A) In terms of ontological loneliness, the answer should be clear. An essential dichotomy is woven into the very fabric of the religious experience. As such, this basic dialectic is not subject to "solutions;" it is part of the definition of religious existence. B) There is no a priori reason why there should not be a solution to the problem of historical loneliness. This feeling does not stem from any inherent qualities or basic definitions of religiosity. Rather, it is the product of the confrontation of the man of faith with specific historical and cultural circumstances. Therefore, as you read the essay, keep in mind the following questions: what are the possible solutions to this problem? Is it perhaps insoluble? Even if the problem admits of no solution, one must still respond to it somehow. What course of action does the Rav advocate? We shall return to consider these questions when we reach the end of the book.

A READING GUIDE To assist you in following the Rav's argument, I would like to end by presenting two outlines of the book, one briefly presenting its overall structure and the other detailing the contents of each chapter. [Note that I follow the chapter numbering in the Doubleday-Aronson edition. While the original Tradition 1965 edition counts the introduction as Chapter 1, the Doubleday edition does not number it. Therefore, Chapter 1 in the Doubleday edition is Chapter 2 in the Tradition version, etc. However, although the Doubleday-Aronson edition does away with sub-chapter headings, e.g. 8.A, 8.B, etc., I will retain these in order to clarify the internal structure of chapters. These sub-chapter divisions are indicated in the Doubleday-Aronson edition by a blank line between paragraphs.]

THE OVERALL STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK:

- Intro - I.A The problem
- I.B Biblical framework
- I.C - II, IV.A Contrasts between A1 & A2
- III, IV.B-VII Contrasts between communities formed by A1&A2
- XIII Ontological loneliness
- IX Historical loneliness
- IX.D, X Conclusion(s)

THE CONTENTS OF EACH CHAPTER:

- Introduction
- I. The Issue: Loneliness
- A. Ontological and historical loneliness

- B. The biblical framework: Genesis 1 and 2
- C-D. Adam 1
- II. Contrasts between Adam 1 and Adam 2
- III. Adam 1's community (natural work community)
- IV. A. Dignity vs. redemption (more on A1 vs. A2)
- B-C. Adam 2's community (covenantal faith community)
- V. G-d as a member of the Adam 2 community
- VI. The cosmic encounter with God
- VII. Prayer and prophecy communities (A2)
- VIII. Ontological loneliness - A1/A2 oscillation
- A. Man's tragic destiny; the role of Halakha
- B. Man must be both A1 and A2
- C. Complete redemption is impossible
- IX. Historical loneliness
- A. Contemporary dilemma
- B. Religion of Adam 1
- C. Autonomy of faith (Adam 2)
- D. Implications of A-C (conclusion #1)
- X. Conclusion (#2)

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #16: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 2 - Defining the Two Adams Once Rav Soloveitchik finishes delineating the problem he wishes to address (see lecture #15), he sets up the framework from which to determine the answer. For the man of faith, he notes, self-knowledge means "to understand one's place and role within the scheme of events and things willed and approved by God" (p.8). Therefore, he turns to an examination of the Bible's account of the creation of Adam and Eve, which should reveal to us the essence and purpose of humanity.

BIBLICAL ANTHROPOLOGY The biblical narrative, as is well-known, contains two versions of the story of man's creation. Biblical criticism attributes this to the existence of two different documents which were subsequently interwoven in the biblical text. Chazal and the Rishonim were aware of these same discrepancies (see For Further Reference, #1), but offered different solutions based on their vastly differing assumptions. Rav Soloveitchik offers a strikingly original solution which flows naturally from his general philosophic approach. Since Jewish thought often takes the form of exegesis of canonical texts (whether biblical or rabbinic), it is often the case, as Rav Jonathan Sacks notes (reference #2), that new forms of Jewish philosophy entail new ways of reading Jewish texts. In Rav Soloveitchik's case, this means extending the Brisker method of "chakira" from halakha to Tanakh and aggada. In keeping with this method, he highlights the differences between Bereishit chapter 1 and chapter 2, offering a unique interpretation of their significance. "[T]he answer [to the discrepancies] lies not in an alleged dual tradition but in dual man, not in an imaginary contradiction between two versions but in a real contradiction in the nature of man. The two accounts deal with two Adams, two men, two fathers of mankind, two types, two representatives of humanity, and it is no wonder that they are not identical." Prior to examining the two Adams, a word about the Rav's methodology is in order. (Permit me to quote here from lecture #3.) Much of Rav Soloveitchik's thought can be described as "philosophic anthropology" - the description of different ideal types of personalities. They are "ideal" in the sense of being pure abstract types, not in the sense of being the best types. In fact, the Rav repeatedly emphasizes that these pure types do not exist in reality (LMF, p.72; Halakhic Man, footnote 1). We can compare them to certain chemical elements or subatomic particles which can be isolated only under laboratory conditions, but cannot be seen by themselves in nature. Thus, due to human complexity, any specific real person will contain within him a conglomeration of various types. However, the point of separating an individual into his component parts is to demonstrate the internal coherence of each position, and thereby to understand better the nature of the complex hybrid produced by the coexistence of the various types. For example, every person is expected to embody the positions of both Adam I and Adam II, but in order to negotiate this dialectic successfully, he must understand each component by itself.

TWO ACCOUNTS With apologies to those who have read "The Lonely Man of Faith," I would now like to present selections from the two biblical accounts, and then the four major discrepancies which Rav Soloveitchik lists. [Note that there are details of the stories which he does not deal with here, but which he addresses elsewhere - see reference #3.] I. Bereishit 1:27-28

"So G-d created man in His own image, in the image of G-d created He him, male and female created He them. And G-d blessed them and G-d said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it, and have dominion over the fish of the sea, over the fowl of the heaven, and over all the beasts which crawl on the earth."

II. Bereishit 2:7-8, 2:15

"And the eternal G-d formed the man of the dust of the ground and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life and man became a living soul. And the eternal G-d planted a garden eastward in Eden ... And the eternal G-d took the man and placed him in the Garden of Eden to serve it and to keep it." The discrepancies:

1. Regarding Adam I, the Torah states that he was created "in the image of God" but mentions nothing about the creation of his body, while regarding Adam II, the Torah says that he was fashioned from dust and then G-d breathed life into him.

2. Adam I is told to "Fill the earth and subdue it," while Adam II is charged to cultivate the garden.

3. In the first account, male and female are created concurrently, while in the second account, Adam is created alone and Eve appears later.

4. The first account refers to G-d only by the name "E-lokim," while the second account also uses the Tetragrammaton (the Shem Ha-meforash, the four-letter sacred name).

EXPLAINING THE DISCREPANCIES The Rav's explanations of these discrepancies are spread throughout chapters 1-6 of "The Lonely Man of Faith." I will present them here briefly, and will then proceed to examine these chapters in more detail. 1. Chapters 1-2: Adam I's creation "in the image of God" refers to his capacity and desire to imitate G-d by becoming a creator, particularly in response to God's mandate to him to "subdue the earth." This is expressed by man's practical intellect, i.e. his scientific ability to comprehend the forces of nature and his technological ability to bend them to his will. Adam II, on the other hand, does not have such a grandiose self-image; he is humble, realizing that he was created from the dust of the earth. He allows himself to be overpowered and defeated by God. While Adam I maintains some distance from God, relating merely to the divine endowment of creativity, Adam II has a "genuine living experience" of G-d and is preoccupied with Him, as evidenced by the metaphor of G-d breathing life into his nostrils. 2. Chapters 3 and 4.A: Told to subdue the earth, Adam I adopts an active, dignified, and majestic posture. He is a conqueror in both intellectual and practical terms. Intellectually, he is able to take the bewildering array of natural phenomena and fashion scientific laws to explain their functioning. This is a conquest of the human mind over nature, or of order over chaos. Practically, he overcomes nature's threats to his existence by draining swamps and discovering vaccines; he harnesses the forces of nature to serve his own ends by splitting the atom and extracting fuel from the earth; and he fashions devices such as the automobile, airplane and spaceship to extend his hegemony. Adam II, on the other hand, is more passive and receptive. His goal is not to exercise mastery but to serve - G-d places him in the garden "to cultivate it and to keep it." 3. Chapters 3 and 4.B: Adam I is a social creature; male and female are created together. His quest for dignity can be realized only within a community, since dignity entails impressing others by means of one's accomplishments. Furthermore, the quest for dignity requires the cooperation of others, since one person alone cannot master a hostile environment. Adam II, however, is created in solitude; loneliness is inherent to his very being. In order to redeem himself from this situation which G-d deems to be "not good" - meaning to forge an existential community which will relieve him of his loneliness - he is required to sacrifice part of himself. 4. Chapter 6: "E-lokim" denotes G-d as the source of cosmic dynamics, while the Tetragrammaton indicates personal, intimate communion between G-d and man. Adam I is satisfied by an impersonal encounter with the former (the cosmic experience), while Adam II craves the latter (the covenantal experience).

ADAM I - THE QUEST FOR DIGNITY Adam I and Adam II seem to start at the same point: both are motivated by their encounter with the cosmos, both search for God, and both try to realize their full human potential. But because of their different needs, attitudes and goals, they approach these tasks in very different manners, so that they end up in very different positions. Adam I sees his main objective, the cultivation of his humanity, in the attainment of dignity. "[B]y setting himself up as a dignified majestic being capable of ruling his environment," he distinguishes himself from and raises himself above the rest of nature. "Dignity is a social and behavioral category, expressing not an intrinsic existential quality, but a technique of living, a way of impressing society ... Hence, dignity is measured not by the inner worth of the in-depth-personality, but by the accomplishments of the surface-personality." (pp.25-26) Why is the conquest of nature dignified? Why does majesty make one more fully "man?" "The brute's existence is an undignified one because it is a helpless one... Man of old who could not fight disease and succumbed in multitudes to yellow fever or any other plague with degrading helplessness could not lay claim to dignity. Only the man who builds hospitals, discovers therapeutic techniques and saves lives is blessed with dignity." (pp.16-17) Hence, Adam I is completely utilitarian in motivation, and boldly aggressive in approach. When he confronts the cosmos, he asks only "how," not "why" - he wants to know how the cosmos functions so that he can master it. "The most characteristic representative of Adam the first is the mathematical scientist" (p.18), who conceptualizes natural phenomena into an abstract system of his own making. [It is interesting to note that, in other works, the Rav presents the mathematical scientist as the model for Halakhic Man!] He is

concerned not only with the functionality of his creation, but also with its order, balance, pleasantness and beauty. This extends to his structuring of society: "[H]e legislates for himself norms and laws because a dignified existence is an orderly existence" (pp. 18-19). All this should sound familiar: it echoes the approach of majestic man in "Majesty and Humility." He espouses an ethic of victory, seeking to master nature and to legislate orderly norms. And, as in "Majesty and Humility," the Rav here emphasizes that, "Even this longing for vastness, no matter how adventurous and fantastic, is legitimate. Man reaching for the distant stars is acting in harmony with his nature which was created, willed, and directed by his Maker." (pp.19-20) However, as in the former essay, the Rav will also inform us here that this approach must be balanced by that of humble, covenantal man.

ADAM II - THE SEARCH FOR REDEMPTION Adam II also seeks to fully realize his humanity, but he interprets this in terms of attaining redemption. The Rav draws a series of contrasts between dignity and redemption. While dignity is a social quality of the surface personality, redemption is an existential state of the inner personality. Redemption is attained by control over oneself, dignity by control over one's surroundings; redemption expresses itself in surrender to God, dignity in defiance of nature; redemption is characterized by retreat, dignity by advance. The contrast between advance and retreat should clue us in to the fact that the dialectical oscillation between these two modes of living is a cathartic process (see lectures #6, #7, etc.). The redemptive surrender to G-d gives Adam II a sense of "axiological security." "The individual intuits his existence as something worthwhile, legitimate and adequate, anchored in something stable and unchangeable." (p.35) Ultimately, this experience serves as a basis for him to enter into an intimate relationship with God. When confronting the cosmos, Adam II does not wish to master it or mathematize it, but rather to encounter it directly in all of its pristine splendor. This is the difference between what the Rav refers to as the quantitative and qualitative approaches to reality (see reference #4). "[Adam II] studies [the universe] with the naivete, awe and admiration of the child who seeks the unusual and wonderful in every ordinary thing and event... He looks for the image of G-d not in the mathematical formula or the natural relational law but in every beam of light, in every bud and blossom, in the morning breeze and the stillness of a starlit evening." (p.23) The cosmic encounter propels Adam II to ask WHY the world exists (not HOW does it function), and to seek out God, whose presence he senses behind all of creation. On the one hand, the natural religious response to this awe-inspiring encounter is to recite a benediction, praising and acknowledging G-d as the source of cosmic dynamics (p.51, footnote 1). On the other hand, Adam II recognizes that encountering G-d in nature is insufficient to attain redemption. There are two reasons for this. Firstly, G-d is both hidden and revealed when one searches for Him in nature. Secondly, the message of the Heavens is impersonal. "In short, the cosmic experience is antithetic and tantalizing. It exhausts itself in the awesome dichotomy of God's involvement in the drama of creation, and His exaltedness above and remoteness from this very drama. This dichotomy cancels the intimacy and immediacy from one's relationship with G-d and renders the personal approach to G-d complicated and difficult... Therefore, the man of faith, in order to redeem himself from his loneliness and misery, must meet G-d at a personal covenantal level, where he can be near Him and feel free in His presence." (pp.49-50) It is the covenant, not the cosmic experience of God, which allows Adam II to attain redemption. (See Reference #5.) The differences between Adam I and Adam II carry over to the type of community that each one forms. We will turn our attention to these two communities in the next lecture.

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INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #17: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 3 - Two Types of Community According to Rav Soloveitchik, one cannot understand man exclusively as a solitary being; he must also be viewed as part of a community. This stems from the fact that existence in community is one of man's basic needs. Therefore, after delineating the features of Adam I and Adam II as individuals (see lecture #16), the Rav proceeds to examine the type of community each one creates.

COMMUNITY OF MAJESTY AND COMMUNITY OF FAITH To further his quest for dignity, Adam I enters into a pragmatic partnership with others, creating a "natural work community." Existentially, Adam I sees himself as a complete, self-sufficient being. Although he does not suffer from loneliness and feels no yearning for soul-to-soul communication with others, he does require their cooperation in order to promote mutually beneficial action. Thus, he creates a community of shared labor, not of shared existence. Since he does not consider himself in need of catharsis or redemption, the community he forms does not elevate his inner self. This kind of approach to the human need for community dominated political theory for centuries:

"The whole theory of the social contract brought to perfection by the philosophers of the Age of Reason reflects the thinking of Adam the first, identifying man with his

intellectual nature and creative technological will and finding in human existence coherence, legitimacy and reasonableness exclusively. To the thinkers of the Age of Reason, man posed no problem. He was for them an understandable, simple affair... They saw man in his glory but failed to see him in his tragic plight." (p.30) Adam II, on the other hand, is sharply aware of "his tragic plight." Having been created alone, and subsequently becoming aware of his distinctness from the rest of nature (see Reference #1), he realizes that "To be' means to be the only one, singular and different, and consequently lonely. For what causes man to be lonely and feel insecure if not the awareness of his uniqueness and exclusiveness?" (pp.40-41) Adam II therefore seeks to create a "covenantal faith community," in which he will be able to overcome his sense of ontological incompleteness and loneliness by learning to communicate with others and to form a depth-connection with them. The recognition and validation of another person as unique as oneself entails relinquishing one's self-preoccupation and sense of all-inclusiveness. Therefore, for Adam II, forming a community is a sacrificial act, or what we have previously encountered in the Rav's writings as the act of tzitzum (self-contraction or recoil - see lecture #4).

COVENANTAL COMMITMENT The covenantal faith community centers around shared commitments, not merely shared interests. Its members work together to "cleanse, redeem and hallow" their existences (p.33). The I and the Thou connect to each other by means of their mutual connection to the divine He (see Reference #2). This connection to G-d takes the form of an absolute commitment encompassing the totality of man's being: emotion, intellect, will and action. When two different people share this absolute and all-encompassing commitment to God, it allows them to overcome the barriers separating them from one another. Opening himself totally to God, man can open himself to other people as well, with shared values and goals serving as the basis for communication. Mutual commitment thus becomes the foundation of the existential community. The overcoming of barriers which separate individuals takes place, as I termed it when discussing "The Community" (lecture #4), along both the horizontal and the vertical axes. Members of a covenantal community join their contemporaries (the horizontal plane) through sympathy, love and common action. They express concern for each other's welfare via, for example, prayer and charity. This sense of fellowship and friendship redeems man by relieving him of his feeling of isolation and incompatibility with others. The "other" is no longer a stranger, an "It," who concerns me only to the extent that he can bring me benefit or harm. Instead, he becomes a "Thou," a person of equal and independent worth to whom I am committed and whom I engage in true dialogue. The gesture of friendship, however, does not characterize the community of Adam I. "In the majestic community, in which surface-personalities meet and commitment never exceeds the bounds of the utilitarian, we may find collegiality, neighborliness, civility, or courtesy - but not friendship, which is the exclusive experience awarded by G-d to covenantal man who is thus redeemed from his agonizing solitude." (p.69)

Within the covenantal community, moreover, Adam II overcomes his insecurity as a temporal being by infusing all his actions with meaning, linking them to the past in which the covenant originated and to the future in which it will ultimately be fulfilled. He joins the covenantal community of past and future generations (the vertical plane) through conveying the covenantal tradition. "Within the covenantal community not only contemporary individuals but generations are engaged in a colloquy and each single experience of time is three-dimensional, manifesting itself in memory, actuality and anticipatory tension. This experiential triad, translated into moral categories, results in an awesome awareness of responsibility to a great past which handed down the divine imperative to the present generation in trust and confidence and to a mute future expecting this generation to discharge its covenantal duty conscientiously and honorably." (p.71 - see Ref. #3)

CONCEPTUALLY DISTINCT BUT INTERTWINING When the Rav writes (at the end of Chapter 7) that friendship or the three-dimensional time experience are categories of covenantal life, we should not mistakenly assume that he means that these can be found only among "religious" individuals. Rav Soloveitchik repeatedly stresses that his discussion here is typological - it deals with simple, ideal personalities, not with real, complex people. The two Adams are theoretical constructs representing different aspects of life. Adam I, at this stage of our discussion, represents a life oriented purely to external accomplishment and success. Therefore, he lives in the moment and is capable only of shallow working relationships with others. Adam II, on the other hand, experiences the depth-dimension of existence and is inwardly oriented. This is why the Rav says that "Friendship - not as a social surface-relation but as an existential in-depth-relation between two individuals - is realizable only within the framework of the covenantal community" (p.68). In addition, since he continually searches for meaning beyond the here-and-now, only Adam II can regard the past and the future as "experiential realities." Real people, of course, experience both the surface and depth-dimensions of life. The Rav's reason for separating these elements is to highlight the paradoxes implicit in our existence, stemming from the seeming incommensurability between these two dimensions of living. Furthermore, not only are real people

complex, but the Rav acknowledges (in Chapters 8-10, primarily in Chapter 9) that even according to his theoretical model, there must be interaction between the two communities, resulting in mutual influence and the borrowing of ideas from each other. For example, he writes: "In reality there are no pure typological structures and hence the covenantal and majestic communities overlap. Therefore, it is not surprising that we come across the three-dimensional time experience, which we have presented as typically covenantal, in the majestic community as well... However, this time awareness was borrowed by majestic history from covenantal history." (pp.7-73) "Certain aspects of the doctrinal and normative covenantal kerygma [=message] of faith are of utmost importance to majestic man and are, in a paradoxical way, translatable into the latter's vernacular." (p.93) "Since majestic man is in need of a transcendental experience in order to strengthen his cultural edifice, it is the duty of the man of faith to provide him with some component parts of this experience." (pp.97-98) We will deal with this subject more fully when addressing the last three chapters of the book.

GOD AS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNITY The covenantal community is composed not just of Adam and Eve, but also of G-d Himself, since both G-d and man are parties to the covenant. "Of course, even within the framework of this community, G-d appears as the leader, teacher, and shepherd. Yet the leader is an integral part of the community, the teacher is inseparable from his pupils, and the shepherd never leaves his flock." (p.45) The section discussing G-d as a member of the covenantal community (Chapter 5) presents several difficulties. Firstly, as I pointed out in lecture #4, although the leader is connected to his community, he is not always PART of the community. Moshe Rabbeinu, the leader of the Jewish People who lived in an isolated tent and covered his face with a veil, was quite remote from his compatriots; how much more so is this true regarding God! Secondly, while the Rav emphasizes freedom and mutuality in the assumption of the covenant on the part of both G-d and man, we cannot ignore the fact that it is G-d who sets the terms of the covenant. Also, man's "inalienable rights" to which the Rav refers were in fact granted to man by God! Finally, although it would seem that there exists a basic dialectic in Jewish thought regarding freedom vs. coercion in divine service ("Na'aseh ve-nishma" vs. "Kafa aleihem har ke-gigit" - "We shall do and we shall hear" vs. "G-d held the mountain over them like a cask"), the Rav here downplays coercion to the extent that he removes it almost entirely from the picture. (See the extended footnote on pp.45-46, where Rav Soloveitchik radically reinterprets the celebrated gemara [Shabbat 88a] depicting the Jews accepting the Torah under divine threat. It is important to note, however, that the Rav is not the only person who grapples with this gemara's conclusion ["mi-kan moda'a raba le-Oraita"] - it has troubled commentators for generations.) While it is not easy to defend the Rav's one-sided approach here, we can attempt to offer two possible justifications for it. First, in "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham" the Rav depicts a complex process whereby man can ultimately overcome the dialectic of coercion and freedom. While the details of this development lie beyond the scope of this lecture (we shall address them in the final installments of this series), perhaps it is possible to read "The Lonely Man of Faith" in light of the final reconciliation in "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham." (There are, in fact, many connections between these two works, which I hope to address in a future lecture.) Alternatively, perhaps we can suggest that Adam II experiences no coercion when confronted by the covenant, but Adam I does. In other words, each of us is composed of both Adams; the dialectic of freedom and compulsion results from the responses of different parts of our psyche to the covenantal experience. To be honest, however, we must admit that while Rav Soloveitchik offers two interpretations of the sense of compulsion which Chazal discuss, neither of them matches the suggestions above.

PROPHECY AND PRAYER In the covenantal community, G-d and man communicate by means of prophecy and prayer - the first is communication initiated by God, and the second is communication initiated by man. Both the prophetic and the prayer communities are covenantal for three reasons.

1. In both, a confrontation between G-d and man takes place.
2. The covenant is a threefold structure, linking I, Thou, and God. Thus, in their covenantal capacities, the prophetic and prayer communities link man both to G-d and to his fellow man. The prophet who receives the divine message must convey it to the community; he serves as their representative before God. Likewise, prayer must include others: one should pray WITH others and FOR others. Indicative of this is the fact that Jewish prayer is formulated in the plural. "The foundation of efficacious and noble prayer is human solidarity and sympathy or the covenantal awareness of existential togetherness, of sharing and experiencing the travail and suffering of those for whom majestic Adam the first has no concern." (pp.59-60)
3. Both encounters, which aim to redeem man, are "crystallized and objectified in a normative ethico-moral message" (p.61). Biblical prophecy is not merely a mystical vision; rather, G-d revealed Himself to Moshe in order to give the Law, and to the other prophets in order to enforce it. The normative element of prophecy allows all members of the community to participate in the God-man encounter by taking part in the realization of the covenant. In other words, prophecy is relevant to everyone, not

just to the select few (see Reference #4). Similarly, prayer entails committing oneself to G-d - it is only effective if a person is ready to cleanse himself in order to encounter God. In this manner, prayer becomes part of a total pattern of life. Since it is "the sublime prologue to halakhic action," prayer "does not occupy as prominent a place in the halakhic community as it does in other faith communities" (pp.65-66). Judaism centers on the entirety of one's daily life, not just on the synagogue.

DEDICATION Although lectures #16 and #17 have not done justice to the wealth of ideas contained in chapters 1-7 of "The Lonely Man of Faith," they have hopefully highlighted the main themes and will enable you to read the Rav's essay more easily. [There remains much of value to be mined from these chapters, particularly from the rich footnotes. Chapter 7, especially, contains many substantive comments of great interest regarding prayer. I intend to return to this chapter in future lectures on prayer in this series.] Having set forth the conceptual framework of the essay - the dichotomy of Adam I and Adam II - we are now in a position to directly address the problems posed at the essay's beginning (elaborated previously in lecture #15). Therefore, in the upcoming lectures, we will return to the ontological and historical loneliness of the man of faith, and will try to draw out the Rav's responses to these challenges. Before closing, I would like to return to the Rav's beautiful dedication of the essay to his wife: "To Tonya: A woman of great courage, sublime dignity, total commitment, and uncompromising truthfulness." Why does he single out these four attributes? Now we should be able to grasp the deeper significance of this tribute. "Sublime dignity" and "total commitment" are the characteristics of Adam I and Adam II respectively. Here the Rav indicates that his wife both understands and embodies the dialectic of majesty and redemption. Consequently, "great courage" and "uncompromising truthfulness" are necessary in facing up to the dilemmas posed by this form of existence. What makes these dilemmas "particularly difficult and agonizing" for the contemporary man of faith is the fact that he is not understood by modern society. By sharing the Rav's multiple and complex goals, Mrs. Soloveitchik helps mitigate and perhaps occasionally overcome the overwhelming sense of loneliness of "The Lonely Man of Faith." (This brings out the uniquely close nature of their relationship - she was perhaps the only person who truly understood him and to whom he could bare his soul.) Together they form an ideal community, united in both worldly endeavor and religious ideals. In truth, every marriage union should strive to embody both Adam I and Adam II elements, constituting both a pragmatic partnership and a covenantal relationship. Thus, although the essay's title highlights the author's loneliness, the dedication appearing beneath it shows that thloneliness is not as extreme as it could have been and offers hope for overcoming it.

<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav18a.htm>

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #18a: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 4 - A Perpetual Dialectic In Chapter 8 of "The Lonely Man of Faith," the two parallel tracks we have been examining finally intersect. "...Adam the first, majestic man of dominion and success, and Adam the second, the lonely man of faith, obedience and defeat, are not two different people locked in an external confrontation ... but one person who is involved in self-confrontation. ...In every one of us abide two personae - the creative majestic Adam the first, and the submissive, humble Adam the second." (pp.84-85) Thus, according to Rav Soloveitchik, each of us is fated to live in a perpetual dialectic, constantly oscillating between two modes of existence and between two types of community. This fact has several important ramifications which we shall now examine.

GOD DESIRES BOTH ADAMS "G-d created two Adams and sanctioned both. Rejection of either aspect of humanity would be tantamount to an act of disapproval of the divine scheme of creation which was approved by G-d as being very good." (p.85) This is a radical message for a religious thinker. Clearly, any person animated by faith will proclaim to others that G-d calls upon them to live out the values of Adam II, covenantal man. But here Rav Soloveitchik reciprocally calls upon people of faith not to forsake the goals of Adam I, majestic man! The Rav grants powerful affirmation to this-worldly existence, reminding us that just as G-d wants us to strive for personal and communal sanctity, He also bids us to build and to create within the world. In other words, contrary to the popular understanding, there is religious value not only to the actions of Adam II but to those of Adam I as well. He fulfills the divine mandate of "Fill the earth and subdue it" and displays his tzelem Elokim (divine image) through his creative involvement in the world of human affairs. Thus, he occupies a central position within the divinely-willed scheme of events. Rav Soloveitchik's approach silences the Enlightenment critique of religion (still voiced in our day), which portrays religion as the enemy of human progress and cultural development. According to these critics, religion produces at best a quietistic and passive personality who has no interest in engaging the world around him. The Rav, in an about-face from this position, states that not only are science, technology and culture not inherently antithetical and challenging to

religion, but they are in fact desired by G-d and therefore integrated into the broader religious worldview!

Furthermore, the Rav asserts what amounts to the independent value of man's creative cultural endeavor. Of course, he believes that these efforts must ultimately be within the bounds of Halakha. But once this is assured, their value is not dependent on the service they render to that which is religious in the narrow sense. The attainment of dignity is a value in its own right. For example, we do not have to say that it is good that man lofts satellites into orbit because now we can broadcast shiurim by one or another rabbi around the globe. Rather, we value the human conquest of space because it is a breathtaking expression of man's majesty, his technical prowess and his creative spirit. "Let us not forget that the majestic community is willed by G-d as much as the covenantal faith community. He wants man to engage in the pursuit of majesty-dignity as well as redemptiveness." (p.81)

COMPLETE REDEMPTION IS UNATTAINABLE The perpetual dialectic between two modes of existence has another, more tragic, consequence: "The dialectical awareness, the steady oscillating between the majestic natural community and the covenantal faith community renders the act of complete redemption unrealizable." (p.80) Had majestic man and covenantal man been two separate people, each abiding in his own community, all would have been well. Each one would have confronted a certain set of problems and would have been provided with the means to solve them. However, the fact that G-d bids man to adopt both modes of existence gives rise to insoluble difficulties, foremost among them being the problem of loneliness. Adam I is unaware of his loneliness, while Adam II confronts this burdensome experience and is capable of redeeming himself from it (via his covenantal relationship with both G-d and man). However, the fact that man must oscillate between two ways of living and perceiving the world places him in a quandary. While living as Adam II, he becomes aware of his loneliness, but he is not afforded the opportunity to overcome it totally. The only way to defeat loneliness is to immerse oneself fully in covenantal existence, and G-d denies man this option by demanding that man participate in the majestic community as well. "When man gives himself to the covenantal community the Halakha reminds him that he is also wanted and needed in another community, the cosmic-majestic, and when it comes across man when he is involved in the creative enterprise of the majestic community, it does not let him forget that he is a covenantal being who will never find self-fulfillment outside of the covenant and that G-d awaits his return to the covenantal community." (pp.82-83) This results in what we referred to earlier (lecture #15) as the man of faith's ontological loneliness (thus designated because this type of loneliness is woven into the very fabric of the religious experience). "Because of this onward movement from center to center, man does not feel at home in any community. He is commanded to move on before he strikes roots in either of these communities and so the ontological loneliness of the man of faith persists." (p.87)

CONTRADICTION OR COMPLEMENTARY? Throughout most of the book, Rav Soloveitchik portrays man's oscillation between majesty and redemption in dialectical terms. He depicts an unending tension between two conflicting modes of existence: "[God] summoned man to retreat from peripheral, hard-won positions of vantage and power to the center of the faith experience. He also commanded man to advance from the covenantal center to the cosmic periphery and recapture the positions he gave up a while ago." (p.81) (Note that the Rav uses different metaphors to describe the relationship between majesty and covenant: in the above quote from p.81, he refers to them as periphery and center, respectively, while in the preceding quote from p.87, he terms them two alternating centers.) However, in a brief but highly significant passage (pp.82-84) which I would like to examine closely, the Rav paints a different picture. "[M]any a time I have the distinct impression that the Halakha considered the steady oscillating of the man of faith between majesty and covenant not as a dialectical but rather as a complementary movement... [T]he task of covenantal man is to be engaged not in dialectical surging forward and retreating, but in uniting the two communities into one community where man is both the creative free agent and the obedient servant of God." (pp.83-84) Before addressing the contradiction between the previous two passages, let us first examine the meaning of the latter one.

UNITING THE NATURAL AND THE SPIRITUAL The ability to view man's oscillation between majesty and covenant as a complementary movement is based upon Rav Soloveitchik's assertion that "[T]he Halakha has a monistic approach to reality and has unreservedly rejected any kind of dualism. The Halakha believes that there is only one world - not divisible into secular and hallowed sectors - which can either plunge into ugliness and hatefulness, or be roused to meaningful, redeeming activity, gathering up all latent powers into a state of holiness." (p.84) This statement should be understandable in light of our discussion in lecture #8 of the sanctification of physical life. Much of medieval philosophic and religious thought was permeated by dualism, which viewed the physical and the spiritual to be warring opposites, only one of which could prevail. The task of religion or of philosophy, according to this approach, was to ensure the victory of the spiritual over the natural by freeing man from the shackles of physicality as much as possible (via

asceticism, contemplation and solitude). Dualists despaired of this-worldly existence. Believing that one should strive to become purely spirit, since physicality is the source of evil and hence irredeemable, they felt that one could come close to G-d only by abjuring the material world. Rav Soloveitchik rejects this approach completely. According to him, Halakha denies the dualist contention that the physical and the spiritual are mutually exclusive, and therefore Halakha opposes the dualist conclusion that one must flee the physical if he wishes to attain spirituality. "The Halakha has never despaired of man, either as a natural being integrated into his physical environment, or as a spiritual personality confronting God." ("Catharsis," p.38) Rather, Halakha believes that "G-d saw everything that He had created, and, behold, it was very good" (Bereishit 1:31). Man must not attempt to escape to ethereal realms, contemptuously abandoning the world, but rather must infuse his this-worldly existence with sanctity. The task of the Halakha is precisely to ensure that man lives this kind of life: "Notwithstanding the huge disparity between [the majestic and covenantal] communities which expresses itself in the typological oppositions and conflicts described previously, the Halakha sees in the ethico-moral norm [i.e. the mitzvot] a uniting force. The norm which originates in the covenantal community addresses itself almost exclusively to the majestic community where its realization takes place. To use a metaphor, I would say that the norm in the opinion of the Halakha is the tentacle by which the covenant, like the ivy, attaches itself and spreads over the world of majesty." (p.84) In other words, mitzvot emanate from the covenantal realm, where man communes with God, but they can be fulfilled only by man who participates in the majestic realm: "When you build a new home... When you cut down your harvest..." etc. By addressing every aspect of man's mundane existence, Halakha expresses its desire that man should 1) take part in the earthly endeavor, and 2) sanctify that endeavor. What Rav Soloveitchik is describing here is exactly the process of catharsis, which we have examined at length in previous lectures (e.g. #6-9 and #14; see Reference #3 below for a reminder about the meaning of catharsis). Catharsis results in the sanctification of natural man; seen differently, the cathartic dialectic assures that covenantal man does not become otherworldly and that majestic man does not become demonically unrestrained and egocentric. This leads us to the question of the central goal of Halakha.

<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav18b.htm> (Continuation of lecture 18a.)

HALAKHIC TELEOLOGY At the end of his book *The Halakhic Mind*, Rav Soloveitchik has the harshest words for Rambam's attempt at formulating a teleology of Halakha. ("Teleology" is an explanation of a phenomenon in terms of its ultimate purpose, derived from the Greek word *telos*, meaning goal.) The Rav takes the halakhic system as a given which does not need to be justified in other terms. Accusing the Rambam (in *The Guide of the Perplexed*, not in the *Mishneh Torah*) of trying to make Halakha adhere to values derived from an external philosophical system, thus turning it into merely a means to attain some philosophically-determined end, the Rav counters that Halakha is autonomous and must be understood in its own terms. Its values must be derived from a study of its norms, thereby learning our philosophy FROM Halakha. As we have seen in previous shiurim, the Rav discovered a basic pattern underlying various halakhic norms: the idea of catharsis, consisting of a dialectic of advance and retreat, the latter purifying the former. (See Reference #4 for an example.) In "The Lonely Man of Faith," the Rav offers his own teleology of Halakha, finding it to lie precisely in the attainment of catharsis: "If one would inquire of me about the teleology of the Halakha, I would tell him that it manifests itself exactly in the paradoxical yet magnificent dialectic which underlies the halakhic gesture." (p.82) (See also Reference #5.) G-d summons man to live both a majestic and a covenantal life, and by adhering to Halakha man can answer both of these calls. This can be understood in two ways, both of which receive expression in "The Lonely Man of Faith." A) Although the realms of majesty and covenant remain conceptually distinct and even incompatible, Halakhic living provides a practical means of meeting God's dual demands. Analogously, the Rav writes in "Majesty and Humility" (p. 26): "[Halakha] did not discover the synthesis [between majesty and humility], since the latter does not exist. It did, however, find a way to enable man to respond to both calls." This is an example of a broader phenomenon which also can be said to constitute the *telos* of the halakhic system according to the Rav. In his understanding, Halakha's goal is to help man take constructive action in the face of dichotomous demands and insoluble problems, without necessarily overcoming the conceptual dichotomies or solving the dilemmas. (For an example, see Reference #6.) According to this reading of "The Lonely Man of Faith," Halakha provides a practical means of negotiating the unavoidable tension between the positions of Adam I and Adam II, without reaching a synthesis between these two approaches. B) Alternatively, we can regard Halakha as a unifying and even harmonizing force. Its *telos* is ultimately to unite the natural and the spiritual in man, not merely to provide a roadmap for an endless oscillation between contradictory modes of being. It enables man to live an integrated existence: a this-worldly life suffused with sanctity. This chord is more dominant in "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham," as exemplified in the following passage: "[B]y sanctifying the physical, [Halakha] creates a unified psycho-somatic ["psyche" = spirit, "soma" = body]

individual who serves his Creator with both his spirit and his body and elevates the animal [in him] to the heights of eternity." (p.215) Similarly, the goal of "Halakhic Man" is to bring kedusha down into this world. As we shall see when we study that book, Halakhic Man sees no inherent problems in fulfilling this task, nor does he live a life of dialectical tension.

TENSION AND HARMONY To summarize: Halakha can be seen either as a means to negotiate an irreconcilable dialectic (as in "Majesty and Humility") or as an ultimately unifying force (as in "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham"). Both of these notions receive expression in "The Lonely Man of Faith." How can this be? I think we can gain insight from a very significant footnote (at the end of Chapter 8): "Maimonides distinguishes between two kinds of dialectic: (1) the constant oscillating between the majestic and the covenantal community; (2) the simultaneous involvement in both communities, which is the highest form of dialectical existence and which, according to Maimonides, only Moses and the Patriarchs achieved. See Yesodei Ha-Torah 7:6..." (pp.87-88) This distinction can answer two questions we have raised. 1) The *Telos* of Halakha: According to the first kind of dialectic described by the Rambam ("constant oscillating"), Halakha is a practical response to an unending, insoluble tension. According to the second ("simultaneous involvement"), Halakha is a unifying or harmonizing force.

2) The Nature of the Adam I / Adam II Dialectic: I pointed out above that the Rav generally portrays the dialectic between majesty and covenant in terms of conflicting movements, while on page 83 he describes it as a complementary gesture. Now we can see that these two portrayals reflect the two types of dialectic cited by the Rambam. The first requires constant oscillation, since the two modes of living are seen to be contrasting and therefore they cannot easily abide together. The second, higher dialectic allows "simultaneous involvement in both communities" because the two are now perceived as being complementary. "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham" describes a similar progression of perception: the "natural" and the "reveatory" are first seen as contradictory, then as complementary, and finally they are united. The continuation of this footnote makes an important point about the higher mode of dialectic: "Maimonides is more explicit in the *Moreh* III:51 ... 'When we therefore find [the Patriarchs] also engaged in ruling others, in increasing their property and endeavoring to obtain possession of wealth and honor, we see in this fact a proof that when they were occupied in these things their bodily limbs were at work while their heart and mind never moved away from the name of God...' In other words, the Patriarchs were builders of society, sociable and gregarious. They made friends with whom they participated in the majestic endeavor. However, axiologically [= in terms of values], they valued only one involvement: their covenantal friendship with God. The perfect dialectic expresses itself in a plurality of creative gestures and, at the same time, in axiological monoideism." (p.88) This significantly modifies our perception of the relation between Adam I and Adam II. No longer are they on equal footing; no longer do they constitute equal and opposite poles of a dialectic. Rather, "The perfect dialectic expresses itself in a plurality of creative gestures and, at the same time, in axiological monoideism." This means that although a person should engage in different spheres of activity, he should adopt only one set of values - and these are the values of Adam II. Only they are of ultimate significance: "[A]xiologically, they valued only one involvement: their covenantal friendship with God." When Adam I is uninformed by the values of Adam II, he does not factor G-d into all of his considerations. (Recall that G-d is not a member of the Adam I natural work community.) Nevertheless, his existence has religious significance because it expresses his *tzelem Elokim* and manifests dignity, even if he is not directly motivated by a divine command. But while the ACTIONS of Adam I have religious worth, Adam I is not a religious PERSONALITY because he is not interested in cultivating a personal relationship with God. When a person participates in the majestic realm in consonance with the higher mode of dialectic, it is with the self-conscious intention of fulfilling God's will. Whether engaged in politics or prayer, one must possess constant awareness of being involved in *avodat Hashem* - which is a value of Adam II. This is not to say that we totally reject the values of Adam I. Man's involvement in the cultural domain is not optional - it is mandated by God, and is crucial to Jewish spirituality, which, as we have explained, is rooted in this-worldly existence. Furthermore, as we shall see especially in *Halakhic Man* and "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham," Judaism assigns great importance to human creativity and autonomy (which are Adam I categories) - but these should ideally be incorporated into one's *avodat Hashem*. In short: one must always keep in mind that nothing is more important than his relationship with God, and must gear all of his actions accordingly. We must remember, however, that according to the Rambam, this ideal of perpetual engagement with G-d was attained by only four individuals in the course of Jewish history. Similarly, Rav Soloveitchik assigns the ultimate overcoming of the dialectic, resolving all contradictions and filling the world with harmony, to the realm of an eschatological vision (p.87). However, he claims elsewhere, we can begin to fulfill the eschatological vision while still in this world: "Devekut [the pinnacle of religious achievement attained by unifying man's creativity and autonomy with his absolute religious commitment], which essentially is an

eschatological vision... begins to be realized even within this divided and fragmented world and in the actual life of flawed and solitary man. Judaism always recognized the continuity of temporal and eternal existence, of a world struggling for its existence and a redeemed world, of a polluted world and a world which is completely pure and good." ("U-vikkashtem Mi-sham," p.189) The vision of unity cannot be fully realized before the messianic era, but it can at least point out a direction to us. Perhaps the Rav is saying that although most of us are fated to live in a world of dichotomies and dialectical oscillation, we must strive to the extent of our ability to approach the ideal of unifying the different aspects of our existence. To conclude, what is most novel about Rav Soloveitchik's theory of the two Adams? I would highlight two points: 1) Adam I's existence is willed by G-d and therefore his actions have religious value. 2) Nevertheless, Adam II is independent of Adam I and is ultimately more significant. Religion is not subservient to culture; it is a primordial force which has no need to legitimize self in other terms. This will be the focus of the next three lectures.

<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav19.htm>

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #19: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 5 - The Subversion of Religion Chapter 9 of "The Lonely Man of Faith" is the climax towards which the entire book has been building. In this chapter, Rav Soloveitchik returns to address the questions he posed at the beginning of the essay, revealing to us the full force of the crisis facing the man of faith today. Recall that in chapter 1, the Rav stated that the goal of this work is to examine the loneliness of the man of faith, which is experienced on two planes - the ontological and the historical. These differ both in their cause and in their effect: "While the ontological loneliness of the man of faith is due to a God-made and willed situation and is, as part of his destiny, a wholesome and integrating experience, the special kind of loneliness of contemporary man of faith referred to at the beginning of this essay is of a social nature due to a man-made historical situation and is, hence, an unwholesome and frustrating experience." (p.91) Ontological loneliness, as we explained in lecture #18, is the lot of all people of faith. While difficult and demanding, it is nevertheless a source of religious growth and creativity, since these can come about only as the result of struggle. However, "contemporary man of faith lives through a particularly difficult and agonizing crisis" (p.6) due to his historical loneliness, and therefore the Rav's "prime concern" in the essay is to examine the cause and nature of this latter experience. In order to accomplish this, the Rav first had to establish the framework of his discussion, the Adam I/Adam II dichotomy (chapters 1-7); then he examined the ideal relationship obtaining between these two components of the human personality (chapter 8); and now he can finally discuss the contemporary crisis situation where these two components are no longer in balance. Chapter 9 diagnoses the distortion of faith in the modern world, offering a devastating critique of contemporary forms of organized religion and exposing the lonely and precarious position of the man of faith in all its tragic dimensions.

REJECTING ADAM II The historical loneliness of the contemporary man of faith stems from the fact that his faith commitment, as spelled out in the covenantal-redemptive terms of Adam II, is incomprehensible to modern man. Modern man, due to his great success in the realm of majesty-dignity, has been enticed into believing that the Adam I side of existence is all there is to life. He refuses to acknowledge the inherent duality of man. "By rejecting Adam the second, contemporary man, *eo ipso*, dismisses the covenantal faith community as something superfluous and obsolete." (pp.91-92) Since he embodies only Adam I, modern man thinks in limited, relativistic, human terms and is guided solely by criteria of utility and verifiability (i.e. what is useful and comprehensible to him). Adam II, by contrast, thinks in absolute terms which transcend human finitude, and is guided by a commitment which is "meta-logical and non-hedonic" (i.e. exceeding the human intellect and not necessarily designed to bring about pleasure). Therefore, when the few remaining genuine men of faith (who espouse the Adam II worldview) speak of the basic human need for redemption and issue a call for self-sacrifice and for total commitment to God, they are met by blank incomprehension, if not derision, on the part of modern man. Hence, the loneliness of the contemporary man of faith turns into social isolation, and is therefore a frustrating and unhealthy experience.

THE HEART OF THE CRISIS Rav Soloveitchik is diagnosing not merely the isolation of the religious community within an increasingly secular world. He is addressing a far more tragic and dangerous situation - the secularization of religion itself. The great chiddush of the Rav's essay, its most striking and original point, is that even modern "religious" man rejects Adam II! Contemporary forms of organized religion espouse not the faith commitment of covenantal man but rather the "religious culture" of majestic man; they practice the religion of Adam I. (I would add, as we shall see in lecture #21, that the Rav means to include in his critique not only movements which he regards as heterodox, but also, and perhaps primarily, his own "Modern Orthodox" community.) "[When I speak of modern man's rejection of Adam II], I am referring [not to atheists but] rather to Western man who is affiliated

with organized religion and is a generous supporter of its institutions. He stands today in danger of losing his dialectical awareness... Somehow, man of majesty considers the dialectical awareness too great a burden, interfering with his pursuit of happiness and success, and is, therefore, ready to cast it off." (p.92) Successful Adam I has extended his drive for conquest even to the sphere of religion. He has infiltrated the religious realm and taken it over - and in the process, he has undermined and distorted its very meaning. His is a religion of convenience, not commitment; it is geared to suit his own needs, not to serve God's will. He does not comprehend the meaning of total devotion and does not sense the need for redemption, which are the essence of faith. Therefore, the words of the man of faith fall on deaf ears even among "religious" individuals, and the man of faith finds himself isolated even within the "religious" community. This is his true tragedy, and this presents the gravest peril to the future of faith. In order to assess this situation accurately, we must first examine two issues. The remainder of this lecture will explore Adam I's attitude to religion, and the following lecture will be devoted mainly to the issue of the autonomy of faith (Adam II). Having addressed these two topics, we will then be able to examine the options open to the man of faith when confronted by majestic man's usurpation of religion.

THE RELIGION OF ADAM I Adam I adheres to some form of religion only to the extent that it is useful to him in his pursuit of dignity; he is not committed to religion in an ultimate sense, nor is he willing to sacrifice any of his majestic goals for its sake. In fact, religion for him is merely another manifestation of his search for majesty. Like everything else he does, it is an anthropocentric enterprise, designed to enhance his self-image and to increase his comfort. Sometimes this may express itself in a commendable sense of philanthropy and social activism (think of the UJA, JNF, Israel Bonds, etc.). Adam I, after all, is not simply a crass and materialistic being; recall Adam I's conception that "humanity = dignity = RESPONSIBILITY = majesty" (p.20). But when Adam I adopts some of the outer trappings of religion - ceremony, ritual, etc. - he empties them of their transcendental content, since he is not in search of the redemptive encounter with God. We see, therefore, that belonging to a religious establishment does not make one into a man of faith. The Rav puts it this way: "[Western man who is affiliated with a religious establishment] belongs not to a covenantal faith community but to a religious community. The two communities are as far apart as the two Adams. While the covenantal faith community is governed, as I emphasized, by a desire for a redeemed existence, the religious community is dedicated to the attainment of dignity and success and is - along with the whole gamut of communities such as the political, the scientific, the artistic - a creation of Adam the first, all conforming to the same sociological structural patterns. The religious community is, therefore, also a work community consisting of two grammatical personae [i.e. I and Thou, two humans], not including the Third Person [i.e. God]. The prime purpose is the successful furtherance of the interests, not the deepening and enhancing of the commitments, of man who values religion in terms of its usefulness to him and considers the religious act a medium through which he may increase his happiness. This assumption on the part of majestic man about the role of religion is not completely wrong, if only, as I shall explain, he would recognize also the non-pragmatic aspects of religion." (p.93) This quote deserves careful analysis. I would like to highlight several points. 1. **ADAM I'S USE OF ADAM II CATEGORIES:** As mentioned above, Adam I is trapped within the natural order, interpreting his existence in cognitive and functional categories. Adam II, on the other hand, deals also with that which transcends him and his natural existence. Thus, they possess fundamentally different perspectives. The Rav terms Adam I's domain the realm of "culture," culture being a purely human creation. But as such, its horizons are restricted to that which is humanly perceptible - and this, of necessity, lends the entire cultural enterprise only a limited and relative value (since man is a finite being). Adam I alone cannot find values which transcend himself; only Adam II, who has an intimate relation with God, can speak in terms of absolutes. Adam I therefore faces a problem. He is not satisfied with material success, but also "evaluates his creative accomplishments, making an effort to place them in some philosophical and axiological perspective" (p.95). More importantly, he seeks to lend "fixity, permanence, and worth" (p.96) to his endeavors. But these can be attained only with reference to the conceptual world of Adam II. Thus, in order to "strengthen his cultural edifice" (p.97), Adam I must turn to Adam II for support. By borrowing conceptual categories from Adam II, majestic man can raise his aesthetic experience to the level of the sublime; he can find higher sanction for his ethical norm; he can have access to the therapeutic powers of belief in times of distress; etc. (see pp.94-98). In short: he can introduce into his frame of reference an element of the transcendent, which is not bound by time, place, or human finitude. The metaphor of translation is very pertinent here. Let us regard the cultural-majestic and religious-covenantal realms as speaking two different languages. Rav Soloveitchik makes two important points: 1) the language of the covenantal realm is partially translatable into the language of the cultural realm, but 2) it is not wholly translatable. This act of translation, or of Adam I borrowing from the language of Adam II, is both necessary and legitimate. It is necessary, as we just saw, in order to lend higher value to Adam

It's endeavors. It is legitimate because G-d Himself has willed Adam I's existence. It is possible because "G-d would not have implanted the necessity in majestic man for such spiritual perceptions and ideas if He had not at the same time endowed the man of faith with the skill of converting some of his apocalyptic experiences - which are meta-logical and non-hedonic - into a system of values and verities comprehensible to majestic man..." (p.98) (However, it is important to note that, once translated, these concepts bear little similarity to their original form - for example, see the footnote on p.97.) The problem is that contemporary Adam I thinks that the language of Adam II is totally translatable into his terms. If this were so, then there would be nothing unique and autonomous about the covenantal realm. Adam I thereby makes religion completely subsidiary to culture - he evaluates religion purely in cultural-majestic terms and does not recognize anything beyond that. 2. RELIGIOUS PRAGMATISM

It is legitimate for Adam I not just to borrow concepts such as the sublime and the eternal from Adam II, but it is even legitimate to regard the religious act itself pragmatically. "The idea that certain aspects of faith are translatable into pragmatic terms is not new. The Bible has already pointed out that the observance of the Divine Law and obedience to G-d leads man to worldly happiness, to a respectable, pleasant and meaningful life. Religious pragmatism has a place within the perspective of the man of faith." (pp.98-99) In a somewhat different but related sense, the Rav emphasizes elsewhere the legitimacy of religiosity which is based on simple fear of punishment and anticipation of reward (see "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham," pp.159-161, and Reference #1 below). However, it is crucial that man not relate to faith SOLELY in pragmatic terms. He must be committed to G-d even if this does not appear to bring him happiness and fulfillment, and even if the commitment is not always comprehensible to him. "This assumption on the part of majestic man about the role of religion is not completely wrong, if only, as I shall explain, he would recognize also the non-pragmatic aspects of religion." (p.93) If he fails to "recognize also the non-pragmatic aspects of religion," then he will miss out on all that is unique about religion, and his faith gesture "will forfeit its redemptive and therapeutic qualities" (p.106). 3. SOCIOLOGICAL PATTERNS

Since modern man integrates religion into his overall quest for majesty, not recognizing that faith makes independent and absolute demands upon him, he creates a religious community which is structurally identical to all other communities formed by Adam I. It is a community of interests, not a community of commitment; its members are bound together not by a mutual devotion to G-d and to the attainment of redemption, but rather by the shared pursuit of dignity and comfort. (See Reference #2.)

What does this mean in concrete terms? If man views religion merely as another method for him to attain happiness - not as an autonomous, transcendent, and elemental force which makes demands upon him - then he approaches religion with the question, "What's in it for me?" Religion is forced to justify and sell itself to the public; it becomes part of our larger consumer society. Let me bring one example from my childhood. I recall that during the Sunday morning cartoons, a particular commercial was broadcast frequently. The commercial showed a clean-cut, fresh-faced, all-American family dressed in its Sunday best on the way to church. When they return home, they sit down to a lavish meal, all smiling beatifically and showering each other with love. This heartwarming scene would fade out and be replaced with the legend:

"THE FAMILY THAT PRAYS TOGETHER - STAYS TOGETHER." What message is this conveying? That religion must be marketed just like detergent or toothpaste. That you should be religious because it is good for you. Are you afraid of divorce? Go to church. Do you want happy, smiling children? Go to church. Try it - you'll be pleased with the results. Now, I certainly don't mean to downplay the value of family harmony. It happens to be a value which Adam II as well can appreciate. What is problematic is the "What's in it for me?" attitude, whereby religion must prove its usefulness to the "religious consumer." Man puts up a demand that religion adapt itself to HIS needs, not vice versa. In a situation like this, religion loses its authenticity and its power. It waters itself down in order to attract followers; in fact, it often changes its message entirely. In the supermarket of ideas, religion must market itself on the basis of values which people ALREADY HOLD, even though these ideas are not necessarily derived from religious sources. It tries to appeal to the public instead of teaching them; it reinforces their (majestic) values rather than dictating new ones. People don't usually want to hear about sacrifice, humility and loneliness. They want religion to be less demanding and to provide instant gratification. It should make them feel good about themselves instead of trying to change them. When people who lack an unwavering faith commitment don't like the message they are hearing, they will either simply and complacently ignore it, or they will pick themselves up and move to a more congenial environment. Under these circumstances, who rises to positions of leadership in the religious community? Often it is not the most learned, sincere or pious individual, but rather the best salesman. In the next lecture we will examine the other side of this dilemma - Adam II's stubborn refusal to identify himself wholly with Adam I's goals and ideas.

After further exploring the clash of conceptions between the religion of Adam I and the faith of Adam II, we will turn to the question - what now?

<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav20a.htm>

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #20a: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 6a - The Autonomy of Faith Why is the contemporary man of faith "lonely in a special way" (p.6)? Let us briefly recapitulate the Rav's argument thus far. Although faith (Adam II) and culture (Adam I) represent two independent sides of a dialectic eternally implanted within man, modern man identifies only with the latter. Intoxicated by his success in the scientific-technological realm, he has constricted his inner world to include only those values and emotional responses which reflect and enhance his majesty. The humility and the gnawing sense of incompleteness which characterize Adam II are completely foreign to him. However, this does not mean that modern man discards religion entirely. He adopts some of its outer forms, but empties them of their covenantal-redemptive content, substituting majestic values instead. Thus, the contemporary man of faith confronts a bold and assertive secularity which has infiltrated even into the religious realm. Speaking the "foreign" language of redemption, which frequently entails sacrifice and surrender, the man of faith seems to have lost the ability to communicate with his surrounding society. He experiences not an invigorating sense of uniqueness and a fruitful dialogue between the disparate forces within himself, but rather social isolation and agonizing loneliness. He is misunderstood and ridiculed, regarded by society as "superfluous and obsolete." In lecture #19, we explored one aspect of this problem: the religious posture adopted by Adam I. Today, we shall deal with the second component: the autonomy of Adam II's faith. After setting forth the theoretical foundations of this issue in the first half of today's lecture (#20a), we will examine some of its consequences, both in the intellectual realm (#20b) and in the practical realm (#21). Thus, the second half of today's lecture will analyze Rav Soloveitchik's response to various intellectual attacks on Orthodoxy, and the following lecture will consider, in light of ideas presented today, a number of the Rav's influential halakhic responsa and public policy decisions. COLD CALCULATION OR PASSIONATE COMMITMENT

What is the process by which religion becomes secularized? In the previous lecture, we saw that although Adam I and Adam II speak different languages and hold different values, Adam I needs to borrow numerous concepts from Adam II in order to support his own cultural edifice. This translation of some of Adam II's redemptive categories into Adam I's cultural terms is entirely legitimate. However, modern man is not satisfied with PARTIAL translation; rather, he evaluates religion ENTIRELY in terms of its compatibility with his majestic goals. He thereby makes religion subservient to his own majestic-cultural ends, not acknowledging that the religious domain of Adam II has its own independent demands of man. In truth, the faith experience issues a call to man which far exceeds his limited comprehension and his pragmatic goals. It is, as cited previously, "meta-logical and non-hedonic" (p.98), i.e. beyond reason and not designed to bring about simple pleasure. Why is this so? Faith is rooted not just in reason but in one's whole personality, affecting every level of his being (such as the aesthetic, emotional and moral dimensions, as we saw in the essay "Catharsis"). Therefore, the faith commitment cannot ultimately have a pragmatic or utilitarian basis, since these are only functional categories, stemming from one narrow (albeit significant) component of man's being, namely, the intellectual. In Rav Soloveitchik's powerful words: "There are simply no cognitive categories in which the total commitment of the man of faith could be spelled out. This commitment is rooted not in one dimension, such as the rational one, but in the whole personality of the man of faith. The whole of the human being, the rational as well as the non-rational aspects, is committed to God. Hence, the magnitude of the commitment is beyond the comprehension of the logos and the ethos. The act of faith is aboriginal, exploding with elemental force... The intellect does not chart the course of the man of faith; its role is an a posteriori one. It attempts, ex post facto, to retrace the footsteps of the man of faith, and even in this modest attempt the intellect is not completely successful... The man of faith animated by his great experience is able to reach the point at which not only his logic of the mind but even his logic of the heart ... has to give in to an 'absurd' commitment. The man of faith is 'insanely' committed to and 'madly' in love with God." (pp.99-100) When applied to the man of faith's commitment, the epithets "absurd," "insane" and "mad" denote merely that it is not based on considerations of cold logic or practical benefit. His commitment is non-rational or meta-rational, but not irrational; in other words, it is unrelated to reason or above reason, but it is not opposed to reason. (For elaboration of this important point, see the footnote on pp.107-108.) Here we encounter in full force the Rav's radical break with the medieval rationalist tradition of Jewish philosophy (which we shall examine further when studying "U-vikkashtem Mi-sham," especially chapter 2). According to the Rav, the man of faith's God-awareness, or his God-experience, lies at the core of his perception of the world and his sense of self. This means that he cannot conceive of either himself or the world

without sensing the presence of God. For him, faith is a basic awareness, an a priori axiom, and not a conclusion which can be explained on the basis of certain premises. This leads precisely to the problem of communicating faith to others, which we shall explore in lecture #21. What is crucial for us at this stage of the argument is to recognize that faith is not a function or an outgrowth of man's other pursuits, but rather an "aboriginal" force, a basic calling in its own right. Therefore, it is not subservient to other goals or values, and, in the modern era especially, it must fiercely guard its independence.

AUTONOMY OF HALAKHA The Rav's assertion of the autonomy of the religious realm, and of Halakha in particular, is central to his thought. Before examining its ramifications as regards "The Lonely Man of Faith," let us explore some other contexts in which this issue arises. (In future lectures, we will examine all the works mentioned below; therefore I will treat them here only briefly.) Halakhic Man (e.g. pp.17-29) and "Ma Dodekh Mi-Dod" (pp.70-85) deal specifically with the autonomy of the halakhic system. Rav Soloveitchik asserts that Halakha constitutes an independent cognitive realm, and should be studied and applied according to the tenets of its own internal logic, not according to the foreign categories of historical, economic, or sociological causation. For the Rav, of course, the Brisker method best reveals the "internal logic" of Halakha. In his sharp and succinct formulation: "Kant, in his day, proclaimed the autonomy of pure reason, of scientific-mathematic cognition. [Similarly, my grandfather] Rav Chayyim fought a war of independence on behalf of halakhic reason and demanded for it complete autonomy. Any psychologization or sociologization of the Halakha strangles its soul, as such an attempt must also destroy mathematical thinking. If halakhic thought is dependent on emotional factors, it loses all its objectivity and degenerates to the level of subjectivity with no substance..." ("Ma Dodekh Mi-dod," p.78) While Rav Chayyim and the Rav had their own reasons for developing this "a priori" and autonomous conception of Halakha, it can also serve as a response to the relativizing historicist orientation espoused by both non-Orthodox and the academe. [See also Reference #1 below.]

AUTONOMY OF THE REALM Rav Soloveitchik's book, *The Halakhic Mind*, establishes the philosophical basis for his assertion of the cognitive and methodological autonomy of Halakha. Actually, like "The Lonely Man of Faith," *The Halakhic Mind* focuses not just on Halakha, but more broadly, on the religious realm in general. (The Rav did not choose the book's misleadingly particularistic title.) In this very technical work, the Rav claims that the "epistemological pluralism" of twentieth-century science allows us for the first time to develop a genuine and autonomous philosophy of religion. (Epistemology is the science of knowledge, dealing with the question of how we know things.) Just as contemporary science, especially quantum physics (as opposed to Aristotelian and Newtonian physics), admits a variety of ways of viewing the world and a variety of sources of knowledge, so too must philosophy. Therefore, the elements of religion - in our terms, the details of Halakha - can serve as the basis for formulating a worldview which is no less valid (but also no more valid!) than any other. Since science and philosophy no longer claim to describe everything knowable, there is now room to turn to religion as a source of knowledge - and religion is now free to explain itself in its own terms. [For more on the idea of epistemological pluralism, see Reference #2 below.] "The Lonely Man of Faith" is based upon the same assumption of a plurality of worldviews (Adam I and Adam II), and upon the same assertion of the autonomy of religion. However, instead of treating the cognitive facet of this issue - religion as a source of knowledge - it addresses instead the existential and experiential dimensions. While recognition of the autonomy of religion opens up exciting theoretical possibilities, it can also lead to a sense of alienation from those who do not share this recognition (treating religion instead as just another facet of culture). Thus, in place of the optimism characterizing *The Halakhic Mind*, which looks forward to a new era in religious philosophy, our essay adopts a more sober and ultimately tragic tone in depicting the man of faith's isolation and his frustrating inability to break through the communication barrier separating him from his contemporaries. In an eloquent analysis, Rav Jonathan Sacks draws a connection between the two essays, written twenty years apart (*Halakhic Mind* in 1945 and "Lonely Man" in 1965): "The pluralism of contemporary culture, which [Rav Soloveitchik] was the first to recognize, was both a liberation and a privation. It liberated tradition from having to vindicate itself in alien terms. But it prised tradition from its moorings in the collective order and made it seem as just one system among many, either consciously chosen (the ba'al teshuva phenomenon) or validated by an act of faith which is 'aboriginal, exploding with elemental force' and eluding cognitive analysis. Soloveitchik's genius and the poignancy of his intellectual development are both evidenced in this: that he was the first to explore the positive possibilities of the liberation [in *The Halakhic Mind*], and the first to chart the tragic dimensions of the privation [in "The Lonely Man of Faith]." (Tradition in an Untraditional Age, p.299)

(Continued in Lecture #20b.)

<http://www.vbm-torah.org/archive/rav/rav20b.htm>

INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RAV SOLOVEITCHIK

by Rav Ronnie Ziegler

LECTURE #20b: "The Lonely Man of Faith" (Continuation)

Part 6b - The True Challenge Facing the Modern Believer UNSHAKEABLE FAITH Having arrived at this stage of our analysis, we are now in a position to return to a striking statement at the beginning of "The Lonely Man of Faith" which has puzzled many readers. "It would be worthwhile to add the following in order to place the dilemma in the proper focus. I have never been seriously troubled by the problem of the Biblical doctrine of creation vis-a-vis the scientific story of evolution at both the cosmic and the organic levels, nor have I been perturbed by the confrontation of the mechanistic interpretation of the human mind with the Biblical spiritual concept of man. I have not been perplexed by the impossibility of fitting the mystery of revelation into the framework of historical empiricism. Moreover, I have not even been troubled by the theories of Biblical criticism which contradict the very foundations upon which the sanctity and integrity of the Scriptures rest. However, while theoretical oppositions and dichotomies have never tormented my thoughts, I could not shake off the disquieting feeling that the practical role of the man of faith within modern society is a very difficult, indeed, a paradoxical one." (p.7) How is it possible that these issues did not trouble the Rav? Surely it is not due to ignorance or obscurantism on his part. Anyone who attended the Rav's lectures, especially his philosophy classes, can testify to the Rav's familiarity with all these issues. Why, then, did they not disturb him? The answer flows directly from our discussion of the autonomy of faith. Halakha possesses its own frame of reference and its own methodological integrity. Therefore, it has no need to justify itself before challengers approaching it with outside assumptions. Additionally, since faith is a basic awareness and not a reasoned conclusion, it cannot fundamentally be shaken by cognitive dilemmas. This does not mean that the challenges mentioned above should not be addressed at all. But it does mean, I believe, that these questions should be kept in perspective - true faith will not rise or fall on them. The living sense of the divine is primary; matters of criticism are secondary. In Rav Soloveitchik's words, the man of faith is "animated by his great experience" (p.100), and only subsequently does his intellectual faculty come into play. This point is closely related to two issues touched upon briefly in previous lectures, which we can now comprehend within a broader perspective.

1) PROOF VS. EXPERIENCE:

In lecture #16, we saw that the cosmic experience of G-d renders the cosmological proof of G-d superfluous. There are two reasons for this. First, faith based on rational proof leads at best to intellectual assent to the existence of an abstraction termed "God." Faith stemming from experience, on the other hand, can lead to an intimate personal relationship with the Creator. (This resembles the distinction posited by Rav Yehuda Halevi between the G-d of Aristotle and the G-d of Abraham - the First Cause vs. the G-d of the Covenant. Rihal, however, bases his faith more on the fact of historical revelation than on personal experience.) Second, if a person experiences G-d in a direct and unmediated manner, what need does he have for abstract proofs? Both in "The Lonely Man of Faith" (p.52) and "U-vikkashtem Misham" (p.133), the Rav approvingly quotes Kierkegaard's pointed remark on this subject: "Does the loving bride in the embrace of her beloved ask for proof that he is alive and real? Must the prayerful soul clinging in passionate love and ecstasy to her Beloved demonstrate that He exists? So asked Soren Kierkegaard sarcastically when told that Anselm of Canterbury, the father of the very abstract and complex ontological proof, spent many days in prayer and supplication that he be presented with rational evidence of the existence of God."

2) KATNUT HA-MOCHIN:

In lecture #10, we discussed the dialectic of gadlut ha-mochin and katnut ha-mochin which characterizes gedolei Yisrael (and, in a more moderate form, all Jews). Beside their "depth, scope and sharpness" of thought, beside their bold creative powers and intellectual maturity, the truly great scholars also possess the playfulness and innocence of a child, full of curiosity, enthusiasm and limitless faith. In his eulogy for Rav Chayyim Heller, the Rav painted a very evocative portrait of the "halakhic man-child," which can also describe the Rav himself: "The adult is too clever. Utility is his guiding light. The experience of G-d is unavailable to those approaching it with a businesslike attitude. Only the child can breach the boundaries that segregate the finite from the infinite. Only the child with his simple faith and fiery enthusiasm can make the miraculous leap into the bosom of God... When it came to faith, the giants of Torah, the geniuses of Israel, became little children, with all their ingenuousness, gracefulness, simplicity, their tremors of fear, their vivid experiences and their devotion to them... Whenever [Moshe] fell before God, he cried like a child. Who can fall before his father, raise his eyes to him alone, to seek consolation and salvation, if not the child! ... The mature, the adult, are not capable of the all-embracing and all-penetrating outpouring of the soul. The most sublime crown we can give a great man sparkles with the gems of childhood." (Divrei Hagut Ve-ha'arakha, pp.159-160; in English: Shiurei Harav, pp.63-64)

CONFRONTING CRITICS In short, Rav Soloveitchik was not perturbed by the intellectual assaults on Judaism because of a) the intensity of his faith experience,

and b) the methodological autonomy of Halakha. This can account partially for why Rav Soloveitchik, despite his being the intellectual leader of Modern Orthodoxy, did not directly address in print these conceptual assaults on faith. "He wrote," according to Dr. Moshe Sokol, "about matters (a) that touched to the core of his own personal struggles with Jewish self-definition in the modern era; and (b) about which he believed that with his unique blend of Brisk and Berlin he had much to contribute" (Exploring the Thought of Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, p.133). It is undoubtedly true that the Rav wrote out of a sense of deep intellectual and emotional engagement with a topic. This is what lends his writings a great deal of their power. However, I believe that several additional factors may account for why he wrote about certain issues and not about others. [See also Reference #3.] Let us take, for example, the question of biblical criticism. True, the Rav did not write a treatise on this topic because it held no great interest for him personally and because he felt that others, like Rav Chayyim Heller, had more specialized knowledge on the subject. However, he also makes a significant observation in "The Lonely Man of Faith" (p.10) which would suggest that biblical criticism does not pose as great a challenge as one initially would assume. The critics make their case for multiple authorship based on certain anomalies in the biblical text. Rav Soloveitchik points out in response that the Sages and the Rishonim were also sensitive to these textual anomalies, but they offered different explanations for these phenomena because they were working with different assumptions than the critics. In other words, taking note of textual phenomena is one thing, but interpreting the phenomena is something else entirely.

For example, the fact that different names of G-d are recorded in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 of Bereishit does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that these chapters were penned by different authors. This fact can also indicate that the two chapters discuss distinct typologies of man (as Rav Soloveitchik believes), or different asof G-d (as the Kabbalists interpret), or a host of other explanations. The textual phenomena in themselves do not "prove" anything; they acquire significance only in light of one's preconceived notions about what the text can or should say. Furthermore, Rav Shalom Carmy points out that two approaches are possible when confronting critics: A) One can respond to them point-by-point, but then one is playing in their arena and is constantly on the defensive. B) One can offer a compelling alternate understanding. This is precisely what the Rav does in "The Lonely Man of Faith." Instead of undertaking a detailed critique of the critics' interpretation of the first two chapters of Bereishit, he undercuts their arguments entirely by presenting a cogent alternative. Thus, he DOES actually confront the critics - in an indirect yet constructive manner, rather than in a direct but defensive manner.

APOLOGETICS Related to this last claim is the oft-repeated assertion that the Rav never engaged in apologetics. Apologetics results when a person accepts an external frame of reference and explains tradition in its light. When viewed this way, tradition becomes "problematic." By forcing tradition to fit into a preconceived and alien framework, one effectively places it into the proverbial "mitat Sedom" (Procrustean bed). This inevitably leads to distortion of the tradition, either by assigning it unlikely meanings or by ignoring that which does not cohere with one's theory. In contrast, Rav Soloveitchik had utter confidence in Jewish tradition and asserted its conceptual autonomy. He did not seek to "synthesize" or "harmonize" it with any other system of thought. Rather, he accepted Jewish tradition itself as his frame of reference, mining his vast erudition in fields of general knowledge for ideas which could shed new light on Judaism or enhance his understanding of man. This non-apologetic approach characterizes the Rav's entire relationship to secular knowledge. Imbued with strong faith and a secure sense of self, he was unafraid to expose himself to new ideas, nor did he place limits on his children's reading. The fact of divine revelation, entailing both belief in G-d and a system of norms, could not be changed by whatever he studied. But his understanding of tradition and his ability to communicate it could be enhanced through the study of "the best that had been thought and said in the world." We have just seen that the Rav's acceptance of Jewish tradition as his conceptual frame of reference justifies his selective use of concepts derived from Western thought. There are also, in fact, internal philosophical reasons (elaborated in *The Halakhic Mind*) which justify this selectivity. Unlike the "theories of everything" propounded by philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel, contemporary philosophy no longer trusts overarching and all-encompassing systems. As a good student of twentieth-century philosophy, Rav Soloveitchik realized that - philosophically speaking! - he was not beholden to any one school of thought. Therefore, he had the freedom to utilize insights from different philosophical schools without being enslaved to any one system. This freedom afforded him much greater room for creativity than if the parameters and assumptions of a particular system had confined him. [Interestingly, the Rav made the same point when comparing the Rambam to the Ramban (see Reference #4). While the former was largely beholden to a somewhat stifling Aristotelian framework, and had to express his ideas in its limiting jargon, the latter was more free to exercise creativity.] This consideration somewhat renders moot all the discussions about whether the Rav's thought is existentialist or neo-Kantian, etc. He was far from being an orthodox Aristotelian or Kantian who struggled to justify Judaism in light of his externally-conceived

philosophy. Rather, he was a man of the Massora who creatively and critically utilized the most appropriate ideas he could find in order to understand and explain the Jewish tradition (as well as the human condition).

PRIMARY AND SECONDARY ISSUES Let us return to the question of why the Rav did not set out to address biblical criticism (and a host of other "burning" topics). We saw that a) these issues did not trouble him personally; b) Rishonim had already addressed the "troublesome" phenomena, thereby demonstrating that the force of a question depends largely on one's presuppositions; and c) by proposing a compelling alternative, he addressed the critics in a roundabout way. Beyond all this, I believe that the Rav's primary reason for not writing about these subjects was that he simply did not regard them as the most important issues or the main problems facing Judaism in the modern world. The main arena of combat, in his opinion, was the soul, not the mind. We saw that the Rav believed that the God-experience lies at the core of faith, and the role of the intellect is only a posteriori - it is both ancillary and subsequent to the faith-experience. Therefore, there is no point in addressing questions of the intellect before one establishes within himself an experiential basis of faith. Conversely, once one has established this basis, then questions of the intellect become less urgent. Thus, the Rav chose to address primarily issues related to the human existential situation: the possibility of experiencing faith within contemporary society, the relationship between the fundamental attitudes of modernity and religiosity, and the experiential crisis of the contemporary believer. [See also Reference #5.] He states clearly at the outset of "The Lonely Man of Faith" that he does not want to deal with the abstract, intellectual side of the problem of faith and reason, but rather with its existential dimension: "Theory is not my concern at the moment. I want instead to focus attention on a human life situation in which the man of faith as an individual concrete being, with his cares and hopes, concerns and needs, joys and sad moments, is entangled." (p.1) I wish to stress that when the Rav says that he is "not troubled" by the phalanx of problems mentioned previously, this is not equivalent to saying that he is uninterested in them. He took science and philosophy far too seriously to be able to adopt such an approach. Rather, saying that these questions do not trouble him means that they do not shake his faith. Nevertheless, they are worthy of serious consideration. The epistemic autonomy of religion provides an avenue in which to search for answers to these cognitive problems (without recourse to apologetics); and even if this avenue of inquiry fails to provide an adequate solution, the experiential foundation of faith provides us with the assurance that the questions need not be immediately answerable. If one has fundamental faith in the Halakhic system and an inner experience of the truth of Torah, then he will relate differently to intellectual challenges and will even be able to live more comfortably with unanswered questions. Rav Soloveitchik saw his task mainly as helping the modern Jew to understand his tradition, grasp its relevance and appreciate its desired effect upon his attitudes and lifestyle. The Rav's concern, thus, was far more with the crucial question of inner commitment to G-d rather than the secondary issues of intellectual critique. He had absolute intellectual confidence in Judaism, and was convinced that it could ward off all challengers. However, he had less confidence in man's soul, in his depth and strength of character, in his ability to transcend himself and his willingness to sacrifice. In Rav Sacks' penetrating formulation (p.49), "It was not secular KNOWLEDGE, encountered in the University of Berlin, that caused Soloveitchik such searing distress, but secular MAN, encountered in suburban-Jewish America." In the next (and final) lecture on "The Lonely Man of Faith," we will confront the results of the Rav's encounter with secular man.